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•

REMARKS

Ol"~ 1JAJl"IE~D.,

1IlII'rAIIA)

at the
DIIUlER HONORING SENATOR JOHN J . WILLIAMS

Hotel DuPont, Gold Ballroo:D.
WU.m1ngtoD, Delavare
Thur8d.a.y, J anuary 14, 1971, 7:00 p •••

I t 18 a pleasure to be In Delaware tor this ooculon.

come here out at respect and att'eetlon tor J ohn J . WUU... .

I

I am.

here, too, out at what can beat be deeorlbed as an afi'ln1ty o:t the

extremes.
mine.

Your State, tor e.ll2lq)le, is about 75 t1me. 8111Bller than

Delaware ' . h1Ile would be loa t in the abacSowa ot Montana ' .

high Rocldea.

Ivan Delaware ' . lovely ocean 1B dvart'ed by the int1nite

blue ot the Big Sky Country.

Thia contrast In dS.merwlonl hu gone unnoticed In the

Senate during the past few years.

IuJ a atter

the roles were reversed 180 degreea.
giant.

Delavare otten appeared the

Not only did i t appear to be, it wu.

the man who brings U8 here tonight.

ot :tact, san.timea

I t was

80

beeause ot

f

J ohn J . Williams gave Delaware a towering presence 1n the

Senate .

Hi. voice ampUfied the name ot the State.

of all Delava.r1ans sparkled brighter in the mirror

The reputation

or

his personal

integrity.
Delaware took a tovn-eounellman of Mil1aboro, Uttle known

outside this State, and sent him to Wuhlngton.

Jow, Delaware baa

got back a SeDator of Int eznational renown and the natlm t B ombudsman
tor fiscal mraU ty 1n the federal government.

Delavare's gain 1s the nation ' . loa ••

For me, J ohn Wl111&1118'

departure t'rca. the Senate 1_ deeply tel t 1n a personal aenae.

I mi•• 1

1n particular, the brealctaata 'Which we uaed to share regularly 1n the

Senate cateterla.
nonaen&e time.
people, it h

Seven o 'cloek 1n the Jl¥)rnlng, as you know, 1. a no ...

I t is

DO

time tor

CCIIl~.

• grim and tutile time.

Wl111&1J111 bad another alde.

To put 1 t blWltl,y I tor any

However, that hour with John

I t vas a time to put the problema ot the

nation and the world 1n clearer perspective.

I t was a time to match

up our agreements and to define our disagreements.

Above all else, 1t vaa a time to establhh an enduring
fr1endship.

Notwithstanding differences

our f'r1endah1p has grown out

or

or

party and approa.chee,

mutual candor and mutual reepeet.

As I told the Senate a short time ago:

"we have been at all times open wi ttl one another.
At all times we

}mew

where we each 8tood; and moat

important, perhapa, we re.pected each other'. op1n1ona.-

All too aeldom 18 one priv1leged to have that kind
rriendship and that kind

or

trust.

~

You will understand, then,Yhat

I mean when I 88iY aimply that I will mha J ohn Willlama.

I will 1111..

rrr:f triend 1n the Sena. te.

The nat1on, as I 8ald, 1a _180 go1ng to reel the departure
of John Willlams fran the Senate.

He has been a t'rtend

He has been a force ror fiscal moraUty.
canmon Benae.

or rrugau ty.

He has been a paragon of

J ohn Williams had the couzage to tread in the darker
recesses ot government and to illumine them vi th vivid reports on
what he encountered.

1

He served as a kind ot light/ning rod,. attract ..

ing to himself the tlashes ot malf'easance and inept! tude which occur
from

t1me- to ...t1me in publ1c life as they do 1n private Ute.
That 1s no easy reaponaibill ty to assume 1n government.

It 1s even JIWlre difficult to discharge 1 t with justice and lntegri ty.
The tact is that it one chooses to delve into natters ot this kind,.

the invitation to

&

spectacular witch - hunt 18 ever present.

The

media at eol'l!l'.ll.m1cation 1s available at all t1mes tor the sensational.
I t 1B to his everlasting credit, however, that J ohn Williams declined

to pla,y the part ot I nquisitor.
to the Une ot human decency.

Rather, he hewed, with rugged honesty,

He never yielded to the temptation to

bec ome a mere mouthpiece for malcontents.
He did not even bear hasty wi tneB8.

He bore DO false witness.

John Williams studied and pondered the evidence.
he pressed for facts and more taete.
persuaded that he had the :facts.

Always

He did not apeak untll he vas

Even then, be Invariab.q gave IIdvance

notice to persons who might be Atf'ected by them.

When he apoke out

against malfeasance, he did 80 out of' a senae of' duty.

It

wu never

news to the individuals involved; tbey had already been put on notic e.
Of'ten, however, It came

&8

a ahock to the reat of ua.

ot the f'aeta 1nvarlab.q pul.l.ed the wool

Hia e:Jq:losl tiOD

away f'l"OIII. our eye••

J ohn Williams made his veight felt in all parte of' the
federal gayernment.

He concerned h1maelf' v1.th the I nternal Revenue

Service, the CCIIllllOd1ty Credit Corporation, the IPederal Rousing
I am f'rank. to s8,y that he a.l.so

Actmlnistratlon and other agencies.

found it necessary to concern h1maelf' with certain matters in the
Senate.

I n the end, however, all

~

theae i natltutlons and others

gained strength fran the catharais of' hi. honeat inquiry.

He probed the questionable doings of individuals in both
parties and vlthout rei"erenc e to party.

On occas10n, his work led

to the disc overy of those whose ambIt10ns or cu.p1d1ty had exceeded

their peraonal prudence and public dedication.

More otten, he

encountered and revealed thoughtless wastages of publ1c tunds.

The

extent of the savings for which he was responsible will never be

known.

I n all probab1l1 ty, ma.ny hundreds of mill10na of dollars of

public funds were i nvol ved.
I n the Senate, J ohn Wil.l1ams did "hat needed doing without
pretense or fancy c redent1als.
DO image -makers.

He bad no h1gh ..povered staff.

He had

He had only the sheer foroe of an unadorned canmon

sense .. -eombi ned with an uncommon diligence.

He i8 a l1ving monument

to the princ iple that an interested c itizen ....to be sure a gifted one
1n th1s i natanc e .. -ean master both the politIe s and the f 1scal complex1 ..

tie. of the federal government; he ean do it, moreover, even i n the
absence of special training, tutelage, or political apprentic eship.

That 11 .. It lhould be .

Repreeentati". sorernment in the

Oni ted State. 18 not and ought DOt to bee

at a Ipecla11Hd eUte.

the .xclueh. pl"O'f'1nee

A aoe1ety ot rr.e c1ti&enll requ!r_ the part1 -

c1patlon in goY"ernatent of the range of tree 01 tisane.

vi tall ties

or

It h

one ot the

the Senate that 1 ta 400ra hav. been vide open in that

reapeet.
In 1tl

Senate.

lo~

h1.etory, -.n:Y pathe bave led to the United State.

hrIIera, lavyera, vorltera, clocton, buain"a-D, tellCher.,

outatan4h18 work of J ohn Will1.,. 1n the SeDate

DO¥'

&44a to that Ult.

Be came to the Senate t"roaI thl chi cken teed bulln.eal.
may well prove to be one ot the b_t tra1nln«
. .tel')"

gt"O' Ulda

Tbat occupation
yet tor the

ot the not-ae.-ch1cken teed tlnanc .. of the tederal gcwel"t'88nt.
J ohn W1lli... le1't the Senate at hia own lna1atanee .

lett at • p i nnae le ot poll tieal. acceptance.

Re

He lett DOt becauae be

vas unable to carry the taxing burdena at • Benator ' . ottica.

Rather

he lett beeause he has some stubborn ideas about retirement aa:e.
tbb connection, as in 8C1De others, we are In disagreement.
f'rcII. the Senate, in "y Ju4pent, vas DOt tlmel,y ; 1t vu

J ohn Wl11l8118 sees It another lIa3"

premat~.

So I v111 not press

Since I . . older than he and still. Maaber

I would not Uke him to accuae _

His departure

I admit that In wi thdrav1ng tl"Qll.

the Senate, he vas prac ticing what be preaehed.

the point.

In

ot the Senate,

ot preacing vbat I practice.

80 tar as I can see, only two good resulta emerge tram the
retirement of John Willi_.

I n the nrat place, Caleb Bogge will be

elevated to the role at senior Senator t'roll. Delaware.

I knov h1a vell .

I have been with him on tvo Presidential mis8ions abroad.

He travea well.

He veara vell.

He bu al.resctt made an outatand1na contribution to the

work. of' the Senate.

There 18 JaOre, IlUCh more, t.o COIDe traa b1a t'or the

bendlt at tht& State and t'or the nation.

The retirement
inf'luence 1n the Senate.

or

J ohn WilUama alao strengthens the Montana

I V88 deUghted to note that Senator.elec:t

Roth, whoae rootB are now 1,ni)edded 1n Delavare,vaa born 1n Great J'alla,
Montana.

I ndeed, he waB onc e a .tudent

entering the Semte, not

&8

at mine at the Univenity .

1118

a Democrat, but as a Republican, I 'trust, 18

not indicative of the negligible impact ot

~

We are waiting, now, in the Senate

teaching on hi m.

nth

great interest to Bee

what new eareer vill be purausd by rur old c ol.league, J ohn v i lUama .

We

do not regard it as likely that he will withdraW' into the high H1lIIal.ayaa

for a Ute

or

contemplation.

There 11 alway. 'Ule pa.slb l Uty,

that he may J01n Ralph Kader.

I t.~

that he wil l simply transter hi B baae
a sort

or

Olympua - ln.-Milleboro.

or

operations 1"rom Capitol Hill to

From th1. deUght1'Ul spot, he can continue

or

outstanding Ameri can, thiB Semtor

or

Delaware.

course,

to ua Dlc h more llkely, however,

to hurl well-aimed thunderbolts at targeta across the land.
listening for the distant rumble

or

We

nil

hi. voi ce--to tbe words of this

~or

all .eaeona, J ohn J . Wi lli ams

be

January 24, 1971
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REMARKS

O~~¥D. ,
~~~eral ot

MORTAIIA)

Senator Rlcbard Brevard Russell

What 18 t1tty year. in public l.U'et

It 1& the end ot • war 100.& &F &&Xl • young lawyer'. practIce
in a town where the railroad runs

throuah cotton fleld..

It 1s tbe 11ft ot

a firat election and • seat 1n a State lepalature.
It 18 an ear given to the past aod to the word.a of

&

hm1ly

rich in the law, the b1ble and the bItter fruita ot an ancient \lar.
It 1a an ear g1veD. to the present, to nelab'oora wbe need aDd
do not need, to the rich and tbe poor, to the barab aDd tbe po.tle, to the

black: and to the whIte.

It 1a the Speaker '. cbaJr 1n the Georgia Bouse and

th. learn10a ot the _h1nery througll vh1e1l tr.edota _ _ to

.pea.

What 18 fifty years in public 11t.f
It 1. the coaf'1deoce ot • people wbose confideoce in all else
It 18 the a,aDDY ot an -.ptl public puree vben -.ny baDds

baa been shaken.

stretch out tor help.
It 1& • f'Ury ot truatr.tlon

&.

the laod dries up aDd factories

stand st1ll even a. nen F 1n vant &ad there are the 8Ouoda ot viol.ent 418content r1elng.

It 1. tbe welgblll8 ot plea . . .1nat plea, hope aplll8t bope,

need . . . lost need.

It 18 • -aDdate to decide, wbether it 1. . .y to decide

or hard.

It 1• • Ooveraor'. Rou.e in a nation '. dark hours.

- 2 -

What 18 rifty

y_. 1n~~ ~ ~11
It h • 10na JourQIIY to • natIon's capItol .ad. to the senate

of the United State..
It h

It h

I.

tbe

.ulna of

an 014 experience and • neve

aootber war, another, an d &DOtbel' yet, &ad • lD1l.1taa.t

deten.. ot tt1e nation

defense.

It Ie tbe plea. ot • I)IIOple rell*llberecl out ot tbe past aDd tbe

MUla, at l u t to r ••p0n4 to them.
It 1. all the wa;y. tbat State. draw atrencth trota the federal

It 1. ecbool lunch•• and tood tor tbe bWl&t'y, the taraer helped,
tile row1a buUt, the lICbx)la

~ndecl

aod the d1&nlty

ot

hope

reborn.

It 1. the .atery ot new l_ai.l.at!ve ac:hlnery and, •• conaclence

eo.peu,

it. vJ.e:>rou use.
It 18, at lut, tbe CbaSr ot the SeDate ot tbe United State.

aDd

the blab truat ot • nation.

:rUty ,.arB 1n publIC lite. • •
It cloNe where it be8JUl, where it 18 green aDd tIlere 1e the

Richard Brevard Ru ...ll
WIDder, OeorS1&
A Senator of th4I UBited State••

RD~RXS :<'C~ ~':\J~ :.:'....\":;~;'=~::.:;j

....'2

s::::Yl.~'-:

;':!;;i:-O::C:C

.::.oc-v~~'LS

Cz:c·~C:\::::S

A~ri1

20. 1971

It has been said that we aro a gOVQl':,,-:;cnt of la.ws not of

It r:.o.y be added that

men .

are

\~e

oJ.&O 0.

govc:t"nrr.ent of paper .

Tne

event ·",,::'1oh draws us together here today is r.ot so :::.uch in celebration
\

of ".;.ha.t :!,act as it is

3.

which :ake government

~eanins~ .

celebrOl"tion o'! tl:.c s'.;zvivoJ. of a ::ew papers

\-1hat goes on display

ot the

~~llions

ot

doc~ents

h~re

which havo bou:.d this

toget:.er since its begi;-.ning.

0::

~ogcther,

the profUsion of the past, that the

is what gives permaneLCQ and
govcrnrr.ent .

T.1.e ideas ""C

reach in the give nnd
tbe !'uture

~ess

6over~~cnt

Eo.ch of these docu."ents ",'as selected

for its intrinsic significance .
o~t

to<Ul.y i!.l but a minute diGt1llo.tion

co~tinuity

t:.cy serve to remind us,
proc~ss

of

to the institutions

ca:::ry in our beads acd the
political

t~ o~

docu:~ntation

agre~.....

o~

ents .....a

are of no use to

do~tc

they are accurately recorded ar.d preserved .

The docUlr.entary rccor

is of particular intarest in the

intricate relationship between. the! Presidency and the Senate.
,.

:Born

of Con.:>ti·~ .. ,~ .("O:w~"'·.:'o.'Uisc) t.he ralo.t!.onsJ-.ip, espc...ially in tho'

early

yea~~,

was the ?bject of

arA testing .

e~rimcntation

,

It

wit.t-.stood a:.d survived, of coursd, and st.a.r.e.s t.oeay as tc.e evolutionary

,

I

product ot the precedents

e~t~blis~ed

Zae Sena.te s r.istoric

over the

docu."'(.en~

I

collection co:nprises the

livina record of this eVolutionAry process .
doc~ents ,

Signed by the

ir.. their ()'.m hand .
sigae~ by

?rc~idents

T.1.e first

George Wa.shington

o'Z.~

~oro

y~ars .

and in

These
SO~Q

ar~

original

cases exocuted entirely

the.'1l which Boes on display today ....as

than l81 yeurs a.go.

-.

:

This first Hashi;-.gton docUJ:.e::l:t itself provides a
significant essay

o~

writ';;'en word in the
the Senate .

the

the need for the

relations~ip

int~edia~J o~

:o~ths

firs~ ?resid~nt cond~cted a.~ ucco~ortaole

substit~t~~g

his personal

the

'between tr.c Executive and

It shows roow, in the oarly

~es~ce

!or the

~j

•

of the Republic,
experiment in

~ore fo~ tr~action

'.

of b\U;i:J.ess by paper.
President

.

'.

Washi~on

was acutely aware that his every

act. and ....ord as the nation I s !'irst chie:' executive ""ould be
regarded as precedent for the future .
•

about

t r~se

He was particularly

parts 0:- the Constitution which

wr~le

concer~ed

clear as to what

should be done were not so clear as to how to do it .

A notable

case in point was Article II, Section 2.

It stipulates that the

process of

~bassadors

treaties and nominating

~king

and

other

high of'ticers shouJ.d be undertaken "by and with the advice and.
consent of the Senate."

I·,

Washington had to determine, by experi.".ent , the JOOst
e!fective
, method for giving and receiving such advice and consent.
'.

.

,
While .le was quit.e firm in his belief that. nominatio. :. should
be

"'. , ,~,.

. transmitt.ed in writing , he apparently felt that the int.ricacies of
-

4"

•

-'"

" . __

treaty-making
ffiight justifY a face-to-face confront.ation with the
,
I

Senate.

Accordingly, he sent the letter which we have here today

'.

declaring his intention to ;:neet with the Senate "to advise with
them on the terms of the

-"'-'-" ------.-,-.--.---..
,

~reaty

to be

negotia~ed

.

with the Southern

'----,-----.----...,......~--.-----

'

'.

._'

- 3 tell

His~oria."'ls

t::'o.t it w::.s ::'0-;

\:oS

confrontation.

Tae process of

and

c~plicated

c~~berso~el

:!".rOtl passing carriages .

0.

SUCCQSs!'ul

ver~l c~~~~~co.tion

by the

co~petition

was l ong

of street noi s es

Y.os t i..-aportant ) apparently, was the

fact tr.o.t the presence of the President of tho United States on
the r ostru.:::. of the Senate r.ad an i.'1i'.ibiting e!':'cct on Sena.tor ial

deCate .

The treaty was referred to

c~~ttee ,

it could be cO:l.s i dered in a more relaxed atr.'.osphere .

The President

departed in wGat O:lQ observer called. "a. d1sco:l:tcnted air ."

trar.smitted all subsequent treaty :essages

.

accordingly, whe r a

L~ ~71t1~

He

and it

was

130 years before another President would co:o to the Senate to
discuss a. t reaty , and that was the occasion of teo

su~ssion

of

the Treaty of Versailles by Woodro.... Wilson.
Tne failure of tbat first effort at persooal r epresentation
by

~o~i~cnt Wa~hington

£ct tbe &tagc for

For it led to the practice of

c~~ducting

consent transactions on ?aper

~~

this un-que collection of
}'ortu.~tel~

for

O~

all

being her e today.
~bsequent

advice and

it thereby assured the Senate of

, ..

doc~ents .

~

today, one

lta.'1

, ,

had the historical

,

-,

perspective and good senSe to recognize tr.e worth ot these papers
nea.rly 100 years ago ",-hile the earliest files
i nta.ct .

0:

the Sena.te ""ere still

Tha.t was the tr.en Secretary 0: tho Senate , Anson G. McCook ,

who in 1885 began to

a.sse..~le ~.d

prescrYu t he collecti on.

I am very

);Ilea-sed to note t hat Secretary !>:cCook, ' s daughter , Mrs . Kat harine McCook. Knox,
i s abl e to be here wit h

.

- - - - - - - .. f,~

ow_

\1&:

ioday to help cel ebr at e t he opening ot t his di splay.

-----.....--_ ____ 0-

.•

Thanks to the

of Secretaxy McCook

fOTesi~~t

who followed him, the Senate collection

~ow co~tai~s

~~d

those

several

hundred documents) each of which rr.arks a sigr.i!'icant step 1."1 the
relationship between t he
C~~~ssion

on Art and

Se~ate ~

p~t

of a

The Senate

intends to place the collection

Antiq~ties

'on rotating display as

the Presidency.

co~tinuing

'

,, .,

effort to promote

I'

ur.derstanding of the rich heritage of this
legislature.

Tile

i~vi te

br~"1ch

h~

..

I'

of the federal

"~'

you.r attention to the display and. hope

you will find it a. sou.rce of interest and) above all , a re.ilinder
of the

...

,.' ,

dicension which lies behind the

a!~airs

,

,,~ ~
,
,,

of state.

,

"

,
r
,
,,'

, /.:

I

..

i

,/.'.~.

'.

I
'1

/

'

I I

."'..

'1

I
'

..

~.

,.

----_._---_._._- -

--------_.-.
',.-

~
,.-.

'.

-r ' - ~ - -

-.

- -- ..- - ------,..--..-- - -----.. ____ _
.

.
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.
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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE M],NSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
at a
TESTIMONIAL DINNER IN HONOR OF SENATOR GEORGE D. AIKEN
SAINT MICHAEL'S COLLEGE, WINOOSKI, VERMONT
Saturday, May 1, 1971

I am delighted to have an opportunity to come to
Vermont for this tribute to George Aiken.

Your most distinguished

Senator also happens to be my oldest friend in the Senate.

My

regard for him 1s such that I would be delighted to sing his
praises--even from the top of your highest mountain.

Perhaps,

I should say, especially from that mountain, since I have the
honor to share its name.
It is one of the marks of the civility of the Senate
that a close personal association such as I have with Senator
Aiken bridges the gap of party politics .

I would note in this

connection that we share breakfast almost daily in the Senate
cafeteria.

It is served at an early hour and in the morning

·

.

,

- 2 -

the problems of the nation have always seemed to stand in
clearest perspective .

At least the breadth of vision of George

Aiken makes them so appear .

Having been exposed to his judgments

for many years, I can understand the basis of his reputation
for sharp perception.

In the aviary of the Senate, Geor ge

Aiken 1s catalogued as neither hawk nor dove but as a very
wise owl.
Rather than heap redundant praise on his shoulders,
however, I would like to share with you instead a few thoughts
on the impact which I believe George Alken's preseuce in the
Senate has had on the face of this State, the nation and the
world.
When I see Senator Aiken 1n these delightful surroundings

a~d

among old friends, I find it difficult to understand

why he ever left home.

It i8 much easier to understand why he

comes back so often; he is of the very rock and earth of Vermont.

- 3 I know that he could tnve r emained and settled down
as a successful r aspberry farmer .
He could have remained and continued his work in the
fiel d of horticulture and his' highly or iginal investigations
of wild flowers.
He could have stayed here a8 a local school

dlrecto~

and state legislator.
He was equipped to follow any and all of those
occupations .

Anyone of them, alone, would have been more than

sufficient distinction for a lifetime.

In short, he could have

remained in Putney and put together what would have been a very
appealing and most comforteble life .
But George Aiken , to borrow the phrase of another
Vermonter, IItook a road less travelled,"

He left his heart

here as he followed a family tradition of high public service .
When he moved into the arena of State and federal responsibility,

- 4 however, he continued to resist the comfortable security of
the momer.t.

His native honesty led him to reject the easy

and the expedient .

Rather, he chose to immerse himself, pro-

gresslvely, in more complex aspects of public leadership and,
just as one achievement in Vermont led to another, each political summit in Washington has expanded his vision to new horizons .

He chose, for example, not co-existence with vested
interests, but struggle against monopolistic practices in the

supply of electric power.
Rather than a narrow partisanship, he urged on his
party a positive and constructive outlook.

He did so at a

time when it would have been easier to go along with a
partisanship .

blata~t

It 1s small wonder that Democrats in this State

ever Since, have been hare-pressed to find a candidate to run
against him.

In his last election, I understand, the challenge

to him was such that he

w~s

the grand total of $17.09.

compelled to expend on his campaign
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George Aiken has never pursued change for the sake of
change .

Neither has he been wedded to the traditional way of

doing things out of a sterile traditionalism.

Rather, his

common sense has always been receptive to new ideas .

Change

does not come easily in government, but over the years, the
advocacies which George Aiken fought for have borne fruit.
A notable case in point is the extension of electrical
power service to the rural areas of the nation.

In 1938,

Governor Aiken was able to tell the people of Vermont that
within two years electric power would be available to every
comm~nity

in the State .

His prophecy has long since come true

and as the years have passed: electricity has emerged as a key
factor in the revolution in

ag~iculture.

Its impact has been

especially notable on the dairy industry.
Bulk tanks, milking parlors and bar cleaners have
replaced milk cans, mi lking stools and, regrettably, milkmaids .

- 6 What has been lost in color, however, has been compensated for
by the gain in efficiency .

Machines powered by electricity

have removed much of the drudgery from the farmer's job.
I was struck by recent figures from the Department of
Agriculture in this connection.

They showed that the average

number of man- hours needed to tend a dairy cow has been cut in
half over the last 30 years, while the production per cow has
doubled in that same per i od.

So thanks to George Aiken and hi s

nation
counterparts in other , parts o.f "' the/ , Vermont dairy farmers
along with those in Hisconsin, Minnesota and elsewhere are
:.;, ~:oducing

twice as much milk per cow on half as much work- input.

George Aiken has also been in the forefront of the
revolution in transportation.

Since the 1930's rural road

mi leage in Vermont ha s increased seven fold.

Like c l cctr if ica -

tlon, this advance has brought with itt results which could
hardly have been fore ;;:E.: en Hhen it began.

The highways have

opened up most of Vermont 16 delightful countryside for recreation

- 7 in winter as well as aurnmer.

From elsewhere in the nation ,

Americans have been travelling here in ever increasing numbers
to confirm for themselves that Vermont does, indeed, look like
late
the landscapes painted by your/near neighbor Grandma Moses.
It is no wonder that tourism has become such a vital part of

the 6ts..te's income .
Then there is the Aiken Rural Water Act of 1965.

It

provides small communities throughout the nation with feder a l
assistance in developing water and sewage facilities .

It 1s

bringing great benefits to this state and to many others,
p ~ tably

my own State of Montana .

This landmar k legislation

p£:.ss €. d the Senate by a unanimous vote in spite of the oPPosition

of then PreSident Lyndon B. Johnson.
cf GE: o rge Aiken:

8

ThE tells you something

stature among his colleagues of

b o~:'

pa r·ties.

In recountir.g t h ese achievements, I do not mean to
l e ave the iml.lresBion
single~·handedly .

·:: ~1.at

3~nator

Aiken brought them about

He ·would be the first to reject the label

- 8 lIsuper- man or super- senat or. II
be~n

in the Senate.

The r e are none a nd nE;'!ver hava

Achievements are put together in that body

out of a common response t o a common need and many members perttclpate in their creation .
in motion .

But someone has t o set the t r ain

With regard to rur a l America, George A!ken l s vision

of the future , as seen f r om Varont,

Insphatlon .

has been a compelling

The great esteem with which he is held, moreover,

has been a powerful force in giving substance to this vision .
In my book anc in many others, his support of a policy gives it
automatic respectability .
1~

The fact 1s that his stamp of approval

a sort of national trademark for reliability.
George Aiken haG

~ one

much i n thi r ty yeara of Senate

service to enhance the well - be i ng, not only of those Americans
who live the quiet life of farm and hillside but of all tt:e
p30ple of the nation.

His good sense has stood as a wall

e,gainst assaults on th3 In'cegrlty of our national life.

He has

labored incessantly t.; keep i n check the viole:rvly divisive
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forces which tear at the fabric of the nation's unity .

At the

same time, he has worked to turn back the tides of bigotry which
would erode the nation's meaning.
He is the epitome of the New England of Henry Thoreau,
Yet ,

~is

entlr~

decency and good sense are just as relevant to the

nation--nct only to weal-kept village and hamlet

but to

eroded farmlands and l'I'astt;ti rivers, to run - down factory towns

c:..nd to metropolitan 6.!'eas

in

shambles .

This nation is

in great need of human healing and George Aiken 1s one of its
fineGt doctors.

As

tin~

goes on, moreover, more attention, 1s also

tJcing paid to his vi ews on wor ld affairs and peace .

In that

realm, he has not pursued the course of self- righteous lso1ationiGrn-- to use :11s ONn p n:o:-as e.
recent years as one of

th~

on international

affa ~.;.:

to anyone in the

Sene.·~,::.

:.,

eme.~ t:::'J d

ir~

most knowledgeable men in the Senate
if

::...~.

Rather, he has

th~

\'lord statesmL.D. iE applic able

applies to George Aiken.

I have
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travelled with him to all corners of the globe.

His judgments

of situations abroad have been, as they are at home-- sound and
clear--even in the most alien circumstances.
In underdeveloped nations of Southeast Alea Wich we
visited together, for example, Senator Aiken's background as a
farmer gave him profound insights into the problems of those
overwhelmingly rural lands.

He saw clearly the incongruities

of much which was being foisted upon them by
the name of progress.

UB

and others in

Asians responded to him, not only as an

American but as a human being , one of them,
too, had touched the 8011 .

a

man whose hands,

In Cambodia, as in Laos, in Viet

Nam as in Burma, he left more friends than he found.

George

Aiken personified to them as he does to anyone who knows him
the rejection of a philosophy that would presume to save a
village by burning it down.
Above all else, George Aiken has been du r ing these
past few years, a voice pleading against deepening the tragedy

- 11 -

in Indochina .

At the very beglnning-- and I am going back to

1965-- he raised a flag of warning against the path we had
entered on 1n Viet Nam .

Time and again, ever since, he has

urged a rational peace .

Three years ago, he said that it waB

time for this country to conclude that the war was over and to
declare that it had been won insofar as it could be won by our
participation.

He urged that the withdrawal of our forces

begin without delay .

have
We have tarried too long .

\Olel

perm! ttled the tragedy

to spread too far from Viet Nam-- into Cambodia and LaOB,

It

has now rebounded to sow the seeds of a deepening division in

this nation.
The approaches to Viet Nam

which George Aiken urged

long ago have taken too long to find their way into the policies
of the government .
during the delay .

Thousands more have died or been maimed
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One would hope that his most recent proposal will
not go unheeded .

He has called for a convening of Asian nations

to find a solution to the problem of peace in Asia.
most reasonable suggestion .

That 1s a

In the end, those nations will

have the greatest stake in the kind of peace which is ratored.
It may be that the President's new and welcome initiatives
towards China are a step in that direction.

In any event, when

peace does return to Asia, it will come sooner rather than
later, because George Aiken has spoken out on the basis of his
insights into the problems of that region .
We might well inquire into the source of these lnsight3.
Why 1s it that George Aiken sees clearly into so many situations
whether they are on the banks of the Mekong or Memphremagog.
The secret was revealed many years ago by someone who said:

•

- 13 "Youth 1s not radical; only embittered Qnd frustrated

youth (or any age for that matter) wants to overturn a social
order that will give them no foothold or security.
apt to be stand-pat.

Nor 1s youth

Given reasonable opportunity, youth 1s

liberal and open- minded.

That 1s why folks can be young at

twenty-one or forty-five or eighty, for youth 1s a mental outlook.

Everything 1s before them and they have a vast energy

for doing ... It

Today, the author of these lines 1s the senior Sene tor
from Vermont.

He is second ranking Member of the United States

Senate in point of service.
of the Senate.

He is the Dean of the

Repub~lcans

Except for the vagaries of politics he would be

the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and third in succession
to the Presidency.

He would also be chairman of either the

Foreign Relations Committee or the Committee on Agriculture.
The years have not dimmed the youthfulness of George
Aiken's vision.

They have not slowed the sigor of his step.

In outlook, George Aiken remains more in tune with what the
TV commercials refer to as the 1'now" generation than those who
write them.
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Because of our long- standing r elationship, it has
become something of a joke in the Senate to say that when Mike

Mansfield spewm, you know what George Aiken is thinking and vice
versa .

It seems to me that this reciprocity might be given a

more enduring form .

I noted earlier in my remarks that the

highest peak in the Green Mountain state bears the name

Mansfield .

It occurred to me that a suitable promontory in

Montana might similarly be credited to the Senator from Vermont .
I wn happy to be able to report that the reciprocity,

in a sense , already exists.

The highest point in Montana is

called Granite Peak , and in the United States Senate the word
"granite" is synonymous with ItAlken . f1

The two words are associ-

ated with amazing regularity by colleagues and jourO
nalists alike .
Only two weeks ago I had occasion to remind the Senate that
granite typifies the character and stature of the man .

So I

hope that Senator Aiken will accept my assurance that the highest

,

•

- 15 mountain in Montana is r eally named after him .

And I might

just add that Granite or Aiken Peak , Montana, is three times
as high as Mount Mansfield, Vermon t which, I am happy to
condede, is just the way it is with their respective
namesakes .
To this man of gentleness and granite -- to this man of integrity and
humility -- to this man who belong not only to Vermont but to all of us in this
nation- -I extend on behalf of all his colleagues 1n the Senate our love, affec tieD and respect and to Vermont our thanks and appreciation for giving him to
the Republic.

George Ai ken 1s what

~e

would all like to be.

FOR

o N

R E LEA S E

D EL I V E R Y

ADDRESS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)

at
BOSTON COLLEGE COMMENCEMENT , CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS
Monday, June 14 , 1971, 10 : 00 a , m.

BEFORE THE BOOK IS CLOSED ON VIET NAM

It 1s a good place to he, today, her € in this city
and at this University .

written a long time ago .

Boston 1s out of a chapter of liberty

Boston College 1s from a transcendent

experience of love 2 , 000 years old.

These two streams of human

enlightenment flow together in todey's commencement.

There are young people here and old .

Whatever the

differences in our years, we are hrought face - to - face by these
graduates .

While chr onological gaps between the generations are

inevitable, credibility gaps are not pre-ordained.

I shall try

my best to avoid one in what I have to say to the class of 1971 .
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My remarks will he directed to what we have in
common.

Whatever we may not have, we have the United states

in common and at a most difficult moment 1n history.
we are not passing through the best of times.

Clearly,

Clearly, this 1s

not freedom's finest hour.
Do not look to me, however, to condemn an older
generation for the present state of affairs.

Do not look for

me, either, to blame the nation's plight on the young.

Young

people did not make the situation 1n which, together, we flnd
ourselves; they have not yet had that opportunity.

As for older

generations, it is to be noted only that they have had time to
add to the mistakes which they inherited when they were younger.
So, I will not lead this commencement in a search
for scapegoats.

Let me try,

ln8t~ad,

to set forth where I think

we are, how we have arrived at this pOint, and where we may hope
to go from here.

These questions cannot be considered except in

the context of Viet Nam.

Viet Ham is a book not yet closed.

- 3 It ls, this unfinished war, the rvsdblock to the future.

It

I
remains a funnel into which is drawn a great segment "an
the

nation' 8 ideals, energies and eXTJectatiol.s.
What has transpired in Viet N.lJJl 1s a tragic sto r y
told again and again .

three Presidents .

My own views have hee!l placed before

They have reen stnted in public on many

occasions during the past f1\ e years and before .

remarKS, today, it 1s suffi c ient to note

th~t

For t hese

fifty- five

thousand Americans are deE.d in Viet Nam, cut out of life at

an age not much

dlfferen~

from that of this graduating class .

The wounded a r e three hundred thousand .

Well over $100 billion

of public funds have been spent to support the wa r.

Before the

final reckoning (all the bills will not be paid unt il into the
next century), the cost undouhtedly will have doubled and
doubled again .
A large part of the national economy has been
diverted to support this venture in Southeast Asia.

What has

- 4 needed doing at home by government has not heen done or not
done very well.

In the name of security against threats from

Viet Nam, the inner security of the nation has neen neglected.
We find ourselves, now with an economy that spurts
and sputters but seems not able to hold a reliable momentum.
Heavy unemployment 1s notahle, especially among young people
and returning veterans,
even as it

~rodes

A persistent inflation plagues us

confidence 1n our currency ahroad.

We find ourselves, too, living uneasily 1n a badly
abused environment, with some scientists even dubious of the
capacity of air, water and

e~rth

to continue to sustain

UB,

Not only 1n pollution- control but 1n all public Bervices-safety, transportation, education, sanitation, drug-regulation
and whatever-- shortcomings have been tolerated to the point of
breakdown.

The deterioration is especially serious in the

urban complexes where, together, with the unabated tensions
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A
of race and poverty, it casts a profound uncertainty over the

inner stability of the nation.
These problema cry out for concentrated public
attention.

They call for an input of young energy, new leader-

ship and fresh resources.

adequate supply .

It has not been forthcoming in

That it has not is due in no small part to

the diversions abroad.
Whatever may have led us into the conflict in
Southeast Asia, it 1s now clear that the involvement haa hit
us where it hurts most--ln the nation ' s inner unity.

The war

opened with a Presidential call for support of the Commanderin- Chief; it was met by a patriotic affirmation of national
unity.

Before the wa r 1s over, however, we will have gone

through deeper divisions than any since the Civil War.

In

the end, the re s toration of the nation's unity may well come
again onl y in the common revulsion with the war .

- 5 For the present, bhe involvement goes on.

Even as

t he President has shar ply cut bacK the U. S. troop levels in
Vi et Nam-- and he is to be commended for doing Bo-- the actual
involvement has spread from Viet Nam into Cambodia and Laos into
an all Indochina war . We remain deeply enmeshed.

We have yet

to extricate ourselves.
It is now apparent that even though we may have
thought to enter the wa r as welcomed liberators, circumstances
are 'otherwise.

We find, instead, that our po licies have cast

us in the role of military arhitrator of a brutal conflict
which concerns other peoples.

We find, too , that the conflict

1s not subject to resolution hy the military intervention unless,
indeed, Indochina is to be " saved !! by being I1 destroyed " utterly.
We know now what we did not know at the outset.
The involvement does not s e rv e the i nterests of this nation or
the Vietnamese people .

- 6 That is the bitter reality of this frustrating
exper ience . : We have pursued a well- intentioned but impossible
dr eam .

In its pursuit, the lands and peoples of Indochina

have been torn and battered almost beyond recognition .
Americans have died in the t ens of thousands.

Young

Vletnamese--

men, women and chl1dren-- have died in the hundreds of thousands .
Thr ee simple rice cultures --Vlet Nam , Camhodla And Laoa -- have
been

ove rwhe~ed

by the technology of modern warfare .

Millions

have fled the paddy fields, villages and hill-towns to escape
the bombs and crossfire.
the r e to

11v~

They huddle as refugees in the cities,

in one way or another-- including the widespread

trafficking in heroin-- off the troops .

The swollen urban

populations are fed, in part, by imported rice paid for by
U. S. aid pr ograms-- ironically, in what is one of the richest
rice sur plus a r eas of the world .

- 7 Why?

To what end?

fated enterprise?

What impelled us into this ill-

What keeps us in it?

How can we continue to

order young men to war in Indochina?
These are questions which cannot be put aside.
We have an obligation to clarify what we have been about in
Viet Nam.

That is an obligation which 1s owed to the living

generations as well as to the future.

It is a way of keeping

faith with the men whom we Bent to Viet Nam and who have not
come back.

Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty,

this nation's historic purpose will emerge under the permanent
cloud of the war.

On the other Rand, if an understanding of

the tragic experience assures that this is, indeed, the last
Viet Nam, then the sacrifices which have been asked will not
be without meaning.
It is pointless, in this connection, to try to
put the finger of responsibility on one President or another,
on one party or the other, on the Defense Department, the

- 8 State Department or Borne other .

We are all involved .

There

is no evading a national responsibility.
If the war 1s pursued, today, under a Republican
Administration, it is not to be forgotten that the military

escalation began under a Democratic Administration.

If there

are, now, Democratic Senators and Congressmen who seek to bring
the war to a close forthwith, there are also Republicans whose

dedication 1s to the same purpose.

There are many who today

are disenchanted with the conflict; there were very few at the
outset, either Republicans or Democrats, who opposed the ever-

deepening involvement .

Indeed , who did not support or

acquiesce 1n it?

In short, Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of
partisan politics .

Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in

1969, 1966, 1964 or even 1961 .

In my judgment, the present

involvement is a culmination of a foreign policy which was
born bofore this graduating class .

- 9 Parents here, today, will remember a great war and
its aftermath a quarter of a century ago .

They will remember

a tremendous military power assembled by B united people, a
power which overwhelmed a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.
This nation moved i nto the post- World War II era,
intact and dynamic in contrast with vast areas of the world
which lay in ruins around UB, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt.
In the circumstances, the international leadership of the
United states was sought by friend and former enemy even
it was opposed by the Soviet Union.

a8

As we saw it, then, this

nation's economic strength was the only hope for the recovery
of what came to be called the I1free world . '

As we saw it, too,

this nation's military supremacy, including an atomic monopoly,
was the principal bulwark against the aggressive spread of
what was termed

u

mono11 thic Communism.

II

There began an era of foreign policy based on
those premises.

Tens of billions of dollars of materials,
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services and credits poured out of the United States into
other countries.

Aid went to Western Europe, to Asia, to

Latin America and eventually, to Africa.

In the name of the

United Nations, a war was fought and financed by this country
to hold back Communism in Korea.

We led the United Nations

into a boycott of the revolutionary Chlnese People's Republic
and worked to eXClude the Peking government from the world
community.

Multiple alliances were built which wove us into

a common NATO defense of Western Europe and linked us 1n Borne
sor t of defense arrangements with about fifty nations .

Hundreds

of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad, into military
garr isons and bases 1n Europe and Japan and elsewhere .

Tens of

billions of dollars worth of construction, eqUipment and
weapons and nuclear warheads went with them.
These policies were devised in the name of
national security and world peace .

They were called accurately

bipar tisan and were described less accurately as a mutual
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security program.

The fact is that the policies were and to

thiB day remain largely a one-Bided effort of the United States.
They rest now as they have long rested on the readiness of this
nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost.
For years, there was little reason to question
these policies.

Congress was predisposed to accept the leader-

ship of the President during a period of cold war.

By the

same token, allied nations were predisposed to acoept the

leadership of the United States which alone had the capacity
to sustain this postwar system.
To be sure, there were flaws 1n the structure but
they were not readily visible 1n the exhuberance of the times.
In the first place, the security system relied so heavily on
military power to maintain peace that an undue burden of
responsibility was consigned to the Armed Services and an
excessive drain was attached to the national economy.

A zeal

for a new-found internationalism, moreover, led us, beyond
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essential national needs and humanita r ian considerations, into
an incaut ious involvement in almost every a r ea of the world

either in the name of t!flghtlng Communism!! or "promoting
prog r ess . II
tu r es

~r

This worldwide projection involved heavy expendi-

all kind s of aid - programs and the creation of elabor-

ate U. S . official establishments abroad .
prompted us to take on , as

~llles,

Moreover, it

a number of governments

who were dependents in all but name .

The great vitality of

the postwar economy also created an erroneous belief in its
~nexhaustibl11ty .

Even as late 8S the onset of Viet Nam, we

proceeded as though the nation could have not only guns and
butter but also pay for fat and

tr~in g s .

We pursued these policles, flaws and all, with
little change for many years.

We pursued, them , however, in

a worl d which was changing greatly.
monopoly came to an end .

The nation's atomic

The myth of lt monoli thic Communi sm ll

disappear ed in the political shifts of Eastern Europe and in

- 13 the upheaval in the Chinese-Soviet relationship.

Numerous

new states appeared in the underdeveloped areas, 8S c010n181ism was being reduced to an historic relic.

Europe recovered

and went far beyond recovery to new heights of well-being .
New economic dynamisms emerged, notably 1n Germany and Japan,

even as our own economy showed signs of overwork if not
exhaustion.
It was in these changed drcumstances that we
became involved in Viet Nam.

We became involved f or what

had long been ac cepted as highly worthwile ends.
involved in the name of resisting "aggressive

the name of

II

We became

C omrnun18m~

safe guardlng international peace,"

1n

and in the

name of II honorlng commitments " to a weak and dependent

government.
We went into Viet Nam, 1n short, on the wheels of
the same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had
gone into Korea a decade and a half earlier.

We did so,

- 14 however, almost as an habituated response, with far les6
understanding of the actual situation in Indochina, unmindful

of the changes in this nation, in Asia and in the world ,
Viet Nam was a mistake, a tragic mistake .
To persist in it now 1s to add outrage to the
sacrifices of those who have Buffered and who have died in
this conflict .
To

pers~

in it now 1s to do violence to the

welfare of the nation .

The need is to terminate the mistake not to prolong

it .

No national commitments of this nation remain

charged to the governments in Indochina .

to be dis -

We have armed,

trained, financed and fought for those governments.

We have

done our share-- far more than our share-- to inject them with
the elements of survival.

What last ditch effort, as we are

withdrawing, is likely to do anything more?

Can the dragging

out of the withdrawal do other than add to the tragedy?

- 15 What is needed forthwith is a redoubled effort to
terminate the military involvement.

What 1s needed 1s an end

to the further accumulation of casulaties, costs and prisoners
of war.

What 1s needed is to bring about the safe return of

U. S. forces and all prisoners of war.

And when the guns fall

still, what will be needed 1s to help restore the devastation
of the war.
So far as I can see, initiatives which might serve
these purposes have yet to he taken in the negotiations at
Paris.

It would be my hope, therefore, that the President

with the cooperation of the Senate would seek in some appropriate negotiating forum an immediate cease-fire throughout
Indochina on the basis of:
1)

providing for a series of phased and

rapid U. S. withdrawals in return for a series of phased
releases of prisoners of war; and

- 16 2) a coupling of the final release of all
U. S. prisoners with the final withdrawl of all U. S . forces
by a specific date in the near future .

An agreement on this basis , it seems to me , could
act to close out this ill- fated involvement .

It would also

bring about, I believe, the end of an e r a in the nation's
international relations .

Mistakes have been made during the

past quarter of a century in the conduct of these relations .
Do not think for a moment , however , that it has all been a
mistake .

Much that has been done had to be done, infue endur-

ing interests of this nation .

Much that 1s being done now needs

still to be done .
A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for
example, has been woven with the rest of the world .

It serves

for the mutual enrichment and contentment of hundreds of millions
of people .

By the same token, a sudden rupture of the web could

- 17 bring upheavals and conflicts of a most dlssstrol8 kind.

We

have also begun to perceive in these twenty-five years, I
believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent
peace.

We have come, too, to a greater awareness of the signl-

flcance of human interdependency and mutual concern if the
world 1s ever to know stability.

Moreover, rudimentary

machinery which can give expression to that awareness 1s now
in existence.

It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter
aftermath of Viet Nam, we were to turn our backs on this
advance.

It would be a step backward if we were to veer from

what has been an excess of international involvement to an
extreme of dlsinvolvement.

I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it
1s possible to withdraw from Viet Nam without seceding from

the world.

If we make that distinction--and I believe the

possible to
people of this nation will make it--then it should be/withdraw '

- 18 militarily not only from Indochina but from the Southeast Asian
peninsula without abandoning our vital national interest in
what transpires on the periphery of the Asian mainland .
Similarly , we should be able to reduce sharply
the United States deployment of over half a million armed
forces and dependents in Western Europe a quarter of a century
after World War II without forsaking the essential mutual
pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance .

We should be

able, too, to exercise a firm and discriminating control over
the enormous expenditures which are made in the name of national
defense and, at the same time, still provide adequately for
the defense of the nation .

We should find it feasible to curb

the corruption and carelessness which have filtered into the
Armed Forces without demeaning and discouraging the millions
of dedicated men and women who wear the uniform.

We should be

capable of shutting down obsolescent and over-extended aid
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programs without losing a human compassion for the other
people with whom we share the earth.
These adjustments involve, in the President's words,
1I1owerlng the profile" of the nation abroad .

If they are to be

made effectively, it seems to me that they must be accompanied
by a new and vigorous effort of American diplomacy.

That effort

should be aimed at securing agreements with other nations which
make international stability more dependent on mutual understandIngs and

undertakings and les5 on the unilateral commitment of

the military power of this or any other nation.

Such agreements

in the Far Pacific, for example , would have to involve not only
the United States and Japan, but also the People ' s Republic of
China, the Soviet Union, the Philippines and other nations .
In Europe, a new and updated approach would presuppose a substantial shift of the burden of NATO from this
nation to Western Europe-- a step which, incidentally, is long
overdue and will be pr essed in the Senate

until it is taken.
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It will also call for agreements embracing both East and West
Europe and the anomalous situation at Berlin.
new approach to the security of Europe it might

Indeed, in a
be helpful if

the Soviet Union and this nation were to stand to the side for
a time and let the lead pass to the smaller European states on
both sides of the divide.

The efforts of the two super-powers

might well be concentrated, instead, on ending the game of
musical chairs with regard to disarmament, mutual reductions
of their forces in Europe, and the control of nuclear weapons
which has been pursued for so many years.

In this connection,

some risks for peace are clearly indicated if we are to reduce
the ever - present and immediate risk of the collapse of human
civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy.
In matters of aid and assistance we will accept our share of
responsibility for the well- being of the world but it will be
a proportionately lower share than in the past and it will be
discharged in cooperation with others.
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In sho r t, in the e r a ahead, we will !;et away from

the excess of unilateral inter nationalism which

~as

character-

ized our policies for the past two decades and t r y to recast
our relations wi th others to the end that they are multilateral
in substance as well as in name, to the end that the common
burdens of the world are more equitably ahared.
This transition will derive from Presidential
leadership but not Executive fiat.

It will

dep en~,rather,

on a concerted effort in which the President is joined by
the Senate and the Congress, with each respectful of the
Constitutional sensibilities of the other .

Most of all, it

will depend on a government which can be trusted by an informed
people because it is credible in what it says and does and
because it is alert and responsive to their needs .
You who graduate, today, and your counterparts
throughout the nation,loom large in what may be anticipated
dur ing the decades ahead .

You have the vote and, therefore,
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are in a position to make your weight felt in the conduct of

the government.

That is a highly important aspect of your

role in shaping the nation's future.

Beyond it, however,

there is the part which young people will have played in endLng the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina.
That tragedy will be terminated; I would hope
that it will be terminated very Boon.

The responsibility

for bringing it to an end rests heavily on those of us who
are the "old hands tl of another generation.

To move beyond

Viet Nam into a future of peace will devolve just as heavily
on you.

To open a new era of constructive cooperation with

the rest of the human race, to act with compassion and with
high purpose, that is your opportunity, you who are the
lI

new hands ll of tomorrow.

It is your nation .
of them all.

It is your life which lies ahead.

It 1s your world .

May you make the most

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE llANSFIELD (D . M)lITANA)
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ALCOHOLISM AND NARCOTICS
Ju.'1e 22, 1971
9:30 a . m.
Room 318 _ Old Senate Office Building
Mr. Chairman :

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your Sub committee this morning.
My purpose today is to give

~

unqualified support to

your efforts towards solving the widespread and disheartening narcotics problem in the Armed Services of this nation.

As you have

indicated, Mr . Chairman, these problems are approaching the propor tions of an epidemic.

Unless dynamic and effective action is

i~-

mediately taken , grave consequences will result not only in our
Armed Services, but among the civilian

co~unities

of this country.

as well.
This Subcommittee has provided leadership in the Senate
by focusing attention on this serious problem within the military.
I know that you have had the support and approval of the distinguished
Chairman of the Armed Servi ces

Co~ttee,

ranking minority Member, Senator Smith.

Senator Stennis . and the
I want to assure you that

the Democratic leadership of the Senate intends to cooperate fully
with you as you attack this problem.
I have r ead your report submitted after an extended study
which began over a year ago on drug addiction in the Armed Forces .
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I found it complete , comprehensive, and sound in its recommendations .

I am pleased to see that this past week the President has

sent to the Congress a bill to concentrate the resources of the

nation i n a crusade against drug abuse.

Undoubtedly, the actions

of this Subcommittee were primarily responsible for calling at -

tention to the urgency of this matter, and I am pleased to note
that the Administration has adopted many of your recommendations.

Your Chairman has made it clear that this Subcommittee
is health- oriented, wishes to avoid sensationalism, and is interested only in solving the problem .

His considerable personal 1n-

fluence has been brought to bear on the Congress as well as the

Depar tment of Defense to the end that prompt and effective methods
are being instituted for prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation
of mili tar y personnel who are the victims of drugs.
One need recall only a few of the distressing statistics .
to

reali~e

how widespr ead the problem of drug abuse is in the

Armed Services; 30- 40,000 of our Armed Forces in Vietnam addicted
to heroin in one form or another; the side effect of 875 U. S.
military deserters, many of whom are engaged in illegal drug
activities ; an addiction rate of Over 15% among draftees serving
in Vietnam; and estimates that drug experiments among our Vietnam
ser vicemen may r un as high as 80% compared with about 50% among
U. S. civilian youth gener ally .

A 1968 study also showed that over

one- fourth of the 18- 24 yea r olds at 22 U. S. military posts used
mar ihuana and other drugs .

1

1

.I

- 3Although figures indicate the drug problem to be particularly prevalent among men serving in Vietnam, it is widespread
throughout the Armed Forces, at harte as "..ell 8S abroad.

It is

obvious that these men are in dire need of help, yet few of them
seek medical aid because they are afraid they may be prosecuted.
This is no solution and only adds to the problem.

It is time for

the Defense Department to accept its responsibility for treating
those within its ranks who are dependent upon drugs .

Such individuals

should be identified and encouraged to seek treatment and rehabili tation without fear of any punishment whatever.
As the distinguished Chairman of this Subcommittee has
stated , if the drug epidemic continues to grow among our Vietnam
forces and addicted men are restored to civilian society, uncured,
we will only be transferring the violence of Indochina to the streets
of America .

It 1s an appalling

last two year a 16,000

A~rican

thou~when

we recall that in the

military have been discharged for

drug- related offenses, 11 , 000 of them under less than honorable conditions.
In the President ' s message to Congress on this subject,
he stated,

'~he

Department of Defense will provide rehsbilitation

programs to all servicemen being returned for discharge who want
this help, and we will be requesting legislation to permit the mili tary services to r etain for trestment sny individual due for dis charge who is a narcotics addict.

All of our servicemen

accorded the right to rehablli tation . 1/

1

I
I

must be
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On December 3, 1970, the Senate Committee on Appropri ations,
in its report on the Department of Defense Appr opr iations Bill for
1971, made this statement :
'For a considerable period the comrndttee
has viewed with growing concern increased evi dence of drug use and drug abuse in the military
serv ices . It has also followed carefully the
hear ings held by subcommittees in both the Senate
and House on the subject . The Co~mittee has also
noted the awareness of the Department of Defense
of the nature of the problem and the desire on
the part of the Depa r tment to take remedial action .

"However, it is the view of the corrunittee
that immediate action is necessary and desirable .
Therefore, the committee strongly recommends that
the Secr etary of Defense consider the establish ~
ment within the Department of Defense of a drug
rehabilitation center for the treatment of ser vice personnel volun~eering for such remedial
car e. It is the cOmnUttee's belief that an ad ditional medical facility could be located in unoccupied buildings at an existing base or at an
installation presently planned for closing. Preferably , the location would not be located near
a large metr opolitan area . Such a facility could
be provided under present authority with funds
a vai lable to the Department of Defense.
'~he committee recognizes that at the out set the program would probably be of a somewhat
experimental nature , but believes that the ur gency of the problem end the desirability of a
solution that will benefit both the Department
end the individuals involved make full cons i dera tion by 'the Department an immedi ate concern. 10

An ideal facility for this purpose exists at Glasgow Air
Force Base Montana.

The distinguished Chairman of this Subcommittee,

Senator Hughes, has been there and knows of its potential .

To the

other members of the COmmittee, I would like to pOint out that

..

,

I

1

.•,

-5it has a completely ffiodern, fully equipped,

50~bed

hospital lying

completely idle with x-ray machines , dental chairs, operating
tables, pharmacy, kitchens - in other words everything necessary
to provide immediate medical

treat~ent

of any sort.

needed is an adequate staff to operate it .

All that is

There are family homes,

dormitories, a gymnasium, schools, theaters, clubs, and other facili ties which can be used by a rehabilitation program of this nature.
Glasgow Air Force Base is 17 miles from the nearest town and that
has only a population of
located "near

8

approxi~~tely

5,000 .

Certainly, it is not

large metropolitan area."

It is my understanding that when Senator Hughes recently
proposed to the Glasgo',,' cOll"..zr.unity leaders that an alcohol and narcotics rehabilitation program could be located at the Base, he
assured of the full cooperation of the
was predicated on a

well -r ~~

co~unity.

This cooperation

and carefully designed program .

Glasgow Air Force Base belongs to the
Air Force.

~~s

Depart~~nt

of the

The taxpayers of this nation have already paid more

than $150 million to build and maintain this installation.

A

$12 million mortgage against the homes alone remains to be paid off.
It is essential that a productive use be found for this Base.

It

is fully modern , in fact one of the newest in the Air Force inventory,
is completely equipped, and its facilities are imcediately available .

,

-6I strongly encourage a closer look at this installation
by this committee and the Department of Defense to determine whether
it should be utilized in part for a model alcohol and narcotics re-

habilitation program for active duty personnel of all services .

.I
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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
at
INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, INDIANA, PENNSYLVANIA
Columbus Day,

Mo~daY J

October 11 , 1971, 8:00 p . m.

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

When the history of this century is written, it may
well be recorded that the whole international order shifted
and reorganized itself in a short span of time in the early
1970's.

For those of us who are living through today's changes,

the accelerating transition 1s evident .

What cannot be foreseen

is whether the shift leads, in the end, to a new era of confrontatlon or toward a new plateau of international stability.
How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we in
the United States bring to our understanding of our times.
That 1s why your inquiry here at Indiana University is

80

timely and appropriate .
Let me consider at the outset several manifestations
of the current transition in the world and the responses to
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them in the nation's fo:ceign policy. The most 1maiedla.te, of
course, 1s the Pre kident I s

ne1'1

economic program.

Twenty-five

years of over-extension has stretched the Uo S, economy to the
breaking point..

To avoid a financial collapse} the President

found it necessary to combine what amounts to de facto devaluat10n of the dollar plus a blanket increase in import duties
with a domestic freeze of wages and prices.

Other countries havt:! long been aware that something
had to give in the way the U. S.

nation's financial affairs .

goY~:rnment

waB managing the

When theoe moves caille, however,

they caused great dlst:-cSEl} notably in El:..rope end J8.pan.

What

1s feared abroad 1s not 80 much the Mcvea themselves but what
they could portend.

At stake 1s their export markets in the

United States and, hence, the possible evaporation of a great

their
ueal of /~ - international purchasing p·::n:er o
It is understandable, in the circumstances that the
search fo:,

nE1'l

economic alignmen-cs has intenG1fied.

The United

3
Kingdom 1s moving, for example, toward the European Economic
Community, now) with the support of France.

Germany and, in

fact, the whole of Western Europe 1s

toward closer

t~4dlng

commercial relationships with Eastern Europe.

For its part,

the Soviet Union seems eager to f&cl11tate this shift and, 19
actively seeking to promote it through politIcal stabilization.
Thus, the Soviet government has

the legitimacy of

ac~,owledged

West Berlin as an appendage of West Germany and 1s pressing
for a

wlde~

agreement which

territorial changes which

would~

~ere

in effect, legalize the

effected in Eaatern Europe

after World War II, including the division of

Germ~y.

The United states 1s acquiescing, in these new
trends in Europe) at a pace, however, which
as reluctant as it ia belated.

se~mB

sometimes

Uo S. policies are changing,

too, with regard to the Far East.

It seems to me, we are

learning, 1n paying the terrible price of Viet Nam, the folly
of extending ideological fears ru1d great power animOSities

- 4 into the inner conflicts of underdeveloped regiOlrl.
process of

learnl~g,

meaning for this

the Vietnamese war has beer.

In the

~rained

of

It is revealed, now, Aa a trsglc

natio~.

waste, a revelation that 1s reflected in the president's
program of phased troop

wlthdrawals ~

In that sense, the war

is over for this nation; regrettably, what has yet to be ended
is the milita.ry involvement.

There 1s left in Southeast ASia,

the vestiges of mistakes of the past and they continue to
exact a toll of senseless death snd devaetatlon.

One way or

another--by the action of the President or the Congress and,
hopefully, by

both-~·theBe

vestiges must be removed.

It may be that an end to the involvement will be
facilitated by changes in the Sino-U. S. relationship which
the President ha.s been cultivating.

In <3.ny event, China seems

to be moving from a phase of isolation into
participation in world affairs.

o~e

of more active

The effect of this transitioa
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and the U. S. relp)nse to it may well he causing internal

distress in China, not to apeak of consternation in the Soviet
Union, in Japan and Taiwan.
There 1s a point of central significance in these
and similar

phenom~na

of international change.

In a massive

readjustment, the lingering legacies of World War II are being
liquidated once and for all.
shifts

i~

What 1s occurring 1s a series of

outlook and alignments of policy in many parts of

the world.

It 1s a cataclysmic process, analogous to the

geological adjustments of the earth's crust when pent-up
stresses give ''lay along fault lines to produce a new equilibrium.
'rhe interna.tional upheaval, like its geological counterpart,

causes sharp reverberations which are both wiyespread and
unsettling.
It is somewhat surprising that so many historic
dislocations should linger for a quarter century after the
hostilities of World

lola.r

II .

In the past, matters of this
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kind have often been settled mor e pr omptly--as they "Ter e at

the close of World War I or as they were a century ear lier
following the Napoleonic Wars .

The time lag after World War

II 1s ascribable, in part, t o the peculiar circumstances of

peace when the guns fell silent in 1945 .

What had been a

united coalition of victorious military allies, quickly split
apart into mutually distrustful armed camps organized around
antagonistic ideologies.

Hovering over this split was the

unprecedented threat of nuclear destruction .
There are those who contend that it waB the ultimate
reality of nuclear power which, alone, inhibited the post- war
antagonists from rushing into another direct and more deadly
confrontation.

Hoeve r that may be, the avoidance of a major

confrontation between the two ideologies seems to have been
bought, at lea&t on our part, at the high coat of many peripheral confrontations, of which Viet Nam is the most recent

- 7 and, one would hope, the last .

It was bought, too, at the

price of lingering fears and suspicions about the intentions
of both sides.

In consequence, there have been massive dis-

ruptions of important domestic priorities in order to permit
a wasteful indulgence in a fierce and costly arms competition
which persists to this day.
We have, indeed, Buffered what Shakespear called

li the cankers of a long peace" and can welcome in principle,
I believe, the present series of ec onomic and political adjustments.

They do hold promise of

neutr~lizlng

the unhappy

legacies of a ,,'ar fought t,,'enty- flve years ago.

Some of the adjustments involve the removal of
legal straitjackets which may come to be regarded, someday,
as having been extended exercises in ideological rigidity
and national pride.

The long delay stems, in part, from the

fect that the United

state~

chose to engage in the diplomacy

of non- recognition of Soviet-cictated territorial changes

a~ter

- 8 the
World War II and/consequences of the Chinese Revolution.
For what seemed good and ample reasons at the time, it was
felt necessary to cling to the pre-war territorial status
quo 1n Europe, part i cularly with regard to Germany and the
pre- revolutionary political status quo with regard to China.
We are coming to realize, however, that such policies extended
indefinitely are self- defeating and contrary to our own best
interests.

Thh~

1s usually the case with policles based on

dead fictions as opposed to living circumstances.
While changes in the legal perspective of our policies
are certainly of significance, they are overShadowed for the
moment by the more sweeping adjustments which seek to accommodate to contemporary economic realities .

In general, these

adjustments reflect the fact that the United states, having
served 1n a variety of roles, as the world's chief banker,
policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the chief

- 9 pioneer in outer space, has now approaohed the limits of its

economic capcity and that some of the burdens have to be
redistributed.

It is notable, I believe, that the current adjustments have concentrated on the commercial - financial elements
of our international position- -to the exclusion,
of other over-extended

shortly.

ro~s

unfortur~tely,

abroad, which I shall discuss

However, I would like to take a moment to consiaer

at this point what has occurred under the Pnesldent! 8 ne\v
economic program.

Esser.:t.ially the program involves two basic

elements of our commercial- financial relationships with other
nations.

The first is accessibility to markets, that 1s, the

extent to which e2.ch natlo::1 opens its borders to the competing
products of others.

The second is the method of PBlfments, or

the settling of accounts between the nations.
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In both spheres the economic power of the United
States has been preeminent for the past quarter century.
U. S. markets have absorbed vast quantities of goods from

other nations and sent abroad even greater

q~antlties.

This

nation has led world pollcy, notably in the so-called Kennedy
round of tariff negotiations, into an era of vastly expanded
international trade through the reciprocal removal of trade
barriers.
At the same time, the U. S. has

bee~

at the core--

the central banker, if you will--of the international payments
system.

The settling of accounts between nations has been

based for a quarter of a century on the dollar and on its
convertibility into gold.

The system worked well as long as

other nations were prepared to hold dollars in their reserves
or had free access to U. S. gold.

Neither of these conditions

remains fully operative 0t this time .

So a search for new

devices to facilitate financial exchange is under",'5.Y .

In
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recent

interm~tiOlir"l

conferences, there have been nropoGJ\ls

for the rCBlignment of

v~lues

among the various currencies,

all acknowledging a lessening of the relt;.tlve value of the
dollar .

There

h~ve

also been propoGalu for devising an

internation6.1 substitute for the dollf1.r A.n the

centr~l

element

in the international payments system .
PropoGRls of this Gort reflect) in my ,judgment,

both e healthy dec line of others in their economic
on the United States as well as an

uhhe~lthy

d~pendency

103s of confidence

in the stability of the United states economic structure .
Clearly, the "temporary!! surtax n:... · imports ca.UGes th e dpepest

concern abroad.

It 16

~

understandable concern in

exporting nations au it ought to be on our part.

m~jor

In my

judgment, the eurte.ilment of international trade which is
implicit in thio measure is not the beat WAY, in terms of the
interests of the people of this nation, to bring our international payments into

bettE:~ bala.nce ~

If, fo!' no other

reason, the new import levy, by reising the price of foreign
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goods,

cr~ates

a predisposition to higher prices for similar

goods within the United states.
Because of immediate difficulties, we should not lose

sight of the fact that the era of expanding international trade
which we have fostered for two decades may go down as one of
the truly positive advances in international relations in the

20th century.

It has stimulated a highly useful economiC

exchange that has strengthened the fabric of world stability .
It has served to underwrite, too, a long period of mutual
economic well- being and cultural enrichment .

Necessary though

they may be, the new economic policies are, at best, temporary

expedients .
I

Without indulging , I hope, in excessive hindsight,

am bound to say that the adjustments might have been easier

for us and all the world, had we faced up to our predicament
at an earlier date and proceeded in a more measured way to
negotiate the necessary relief .
So far, the other prin.cipal trading nations have
eschewed acts of
does exist.

reprisal~

That unfortunate possibility,

however ~

Should there be a trade war, it would unravel the

3trands of a beneficial interdependence which have
carefully over the past two decades.

b~en

\'loven so

· 13 ..

In the circumstances, I endorse fully the President s
stress on the

temporary

nature of the surtax and his emphatic

opposition to a return to economic isolationism.
of an inadvertant slide into what 1s

be overlooked.

eschewed~

The possibility

however, is not to

To avoid it, it seems to me that we must take

more fundamental steps to r edress the economic balance than are
contained in the New Economic Policy.

~le

need to go beyond the

negative sanctions so far invokec and deal with Nhat,

largely~

precipitated the necessity for them 1n the first place.
This brings us to the non commercial aspects of the
nation s

~nternational

economic difficulties.

Our present

problem of balance of payments is not so much one of buying
too much and selling too little of goods and services in inter
national commerce, the fact

i~

far more than "Ie have bought .

that, for years, we have sold
Rather, the difficulty arises,

in major part, from the spending of vast amounts of public funds
in order to maintain an outmoded military-diplomatic position in

" 14 the world.

Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that position

flow overseas just as surely as those which go for imports of
goods from other nations.

Dollars spent at home to backstop

that position contribute just as certainly to inflationary
pressures as any other non-productive expenditure in the
federal budget.

In my judgment, we are paying exorbltantly--ln

billions of dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices
which are simply out of date and which have little to do with
the security and welfare of the people of the nation.

Like

other legacies of World War II, these policies and practices

are in urgent need of revision.
There 1s no greater urgency than the liquidation of
the war in Viet Nam.

Ending the war is the most compelling

business of this nation.

The reason why that is so is obviously

not only a matter of cost; before all else, Viet Nam is a human
tragedy which tears at the fibers of the nation's cohesion.

- 15 Nevertheless, Viet Nam is a root cause of the nation ' S present
economic difficulties.

What is involved is an astronomical levy

of government expenditure on the nation s economy in order to
finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of $130
billion .

This expenditure has burdened the productive economy

at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and inflation .

Hence,

it has reduced the competitive position of the nation ' s commerce
in the world .

In two and a half years, it should be noted, the
President has brought about a significant reduction of the
cost of the involvement in Viet Nam.
tion has been, it 1s all to the good.

Prolonged as the reduc
It is to be hoped, how-

ever, that what 1s being attempted 1s not simply a gradual
tapering off of the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residUe .
In Viet Narn, that would still involve, for many years, in my
judgment, continuing expenditures of billions in aid to the
Saigon government as well as U. S. ['orces in coastal enclaves
in order to shore up a regime witn few roots in its own people.
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It would be a continuation of a mistaken war by other means.
It would be a way of being invol ved without seeming to be 1nvolved.

Even if it were possible to attain, it would be a

solution that 1s ill-Buited to the needs of either Viet Nam
or the United States.
The Senate has tried and 1s now trying, again, to
establish a date certain for a total withdrawal of U. S. forces
as the policy of this nation.

Since definite assurances do not

yet exist on this point, it can be expected that the matter will
be pressed in the Congress. i t \'1111 be pressed again and again

until the involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland ends,
lock, stock and barrel .
As in Southeast Asia, this nation 5 economy is carrying in Europe another archaic burden in the name of national
defense.

Two decades ago, the North Atlantic Treaty jOined,

in a common fate with western Europe, the free surviva l of this
nation.

Insofar as I am concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty

was valid then and r emains

pertinen~

to the nation i s defense

- 17 needs todaY7 it i s not the treaty of alliance which is archaic,
rather, it is the bureaucrat:.c military structure of NATO which
has grown up in its name that stands in need of adjustment.
NATO continues to correspond, today, to ci rcumstances
which were defined before many of you were born .
the free societies of Western

Eu~ope

At that time

were heavily dependent on

the United States and the fear of communist totalitarian take-

overs was great.

In terms of today s circumstances, NATO is
1

over··staffed, over-manned, over-offlcered and over-financed
by this nation.

Of the budget of the Department of Defense,

about $14 billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO .

Over

a half - million American servicemen and dependents are consigned
to Europe.
That is an immense diversion of public resources.
Yet, the basic question of NATO is not cost.

If a commitment

of that magnitude were essential for the security of the nation
and the stability of peace, of course, it should be made.

More
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to the point. however. 1s whether a U. S. deployment of that
size and composition has relevance to the situation in EUrope
a quarter of a century after World Viar II.

In this connection,

I returned just a month ago from a series of consultations in
seven nations in western Europe.

The overwhelming mood of

EUrope 1s that of detente and peace. it 1s not of confrontation
and war.

The emphasis is on reconciliation , it 1s on lntra-

European trade, technolog ical exchange, travel and other cultural
interchange.

It 1s not on military power or fear.

Only in NATO

are the game 1 of war still played with any sense of expectancy
or conviction.
In the circumstances, it 1s not surprising that the
European nations are prepared to have us shoulder the prepon derant costs of the organization so long as we are prepared to
do so.

They have no readiness, not to speak of eagerness, to

increase their own role or expenditures for NATO.

While they

want to maintain the North Atlantic Alliance, it is doubtful

19 that the Europeans see the need of the present force
of NATO since they do not meet their commitments to
have not done so for many years.

l ~vel~

t~em

and

It has seemed to me for a

long time that a substantial reduction in our deployment in
Europe is possible and desirable, even as

slm~lar

steps have

already been taken by the United Kingdom, Canada and others.
Let me emphasize my belief that we do need the North

Atlantic Treaty and Alliance and we do need to preserve the
structure of NATO as an element - in-being of western defense
and unity.

But I also believe the organization can be trimmed

to a streamlined standby force without danger to our security
or the stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to
the well-being of th i s nation.
Speciflcally~

I have recommended that the United States

undertake a reduction of its force commitment to NATO by at
least 50 per cent, leaving no more than two U. S . diviSions on
the European continent .

Hopefully, the Executive Branch will

- 20 -

take the jnitiative in this oonnection because it can do so
without further ado.

If necessary,

however~

efforts to that

end will continue to be made in the Congress J ·cumbersor.le·

though it may be to try to legislate an action of this kind.
It would seem to me desirable, too, that a multinationa l
NATO naval force should take over the Mediterranean patrol, thus
permitting a sharp reduction in the overwhelming presence of th e
U. S. Si xth Fleet 1n that sea.

In th e same vein, substantial

cuts in U. S. command participation in NATO and th e designation
of a European as the next NATO commander-in-chi ef would serve to
reduce the presence of the United states in \'I eatern Europe an d ,

of course, the cost which is entailed 1n that presence.
Changes of thi s kind are needed \'lith regard to Europe
and Asia if we are to adjust our policies effectively to the
realities of the 70's.

I think you will se e that the changes

which I have suggested involve an end to flailing at the fears
of the past.

They have much to do with an end to

illusions

of omnipotence and adventurism and a greater sharing of the glare

- 21 -

of leadership which has focused upon this nation for too long.
They have to do, in short, with what the President, I believe,
was talking about when he introduced the
of the Nixon Doctrine.

I

low profile 1 concept

Unless and until we mal(e these changes,

the new economic policy will be, at best, only a stop gap for
our difficulties .
vIe

may anticipate the most serious consequences both

at home and in our relationships abroad unless we grasp the
extent of the transition in world affairs over the past quarter

of a century .

During these years, we have come only haltingly

through successive and delayed stages of adjustment.

He are

paying now for the time gaps in our official perception and
responses to changing international realities.

Vie

are paying

for it in the economic faltering at home and, more seriously,
in the tragedy of Viet Nam.
He stand, now, on the threshhold of a new era in which

prime motivations are appearing which are other than the fear of
aggression and war.

There may exist a possibility of breai{ing

- 22 -

down antagonisms along the gulf separating the Communist states
from those of the western world.

Entered with a clear head and

sure foot, this era may yield the fruits of peace to nations prepared to take the risks of peace.
The promise is there. it may be that it will fall to

a younger generation to work out that promise.

I hope that your

vision of the \'/orld will be far less constrained than ours has

been for the past twenty -five years.

Hlth lucl<, you may be able

to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial
defense or of the defense of ideological systems, but rather as

an element of human survival and well-being.

National resources

can then be committed in far greater degree to the fundamental
problems which know no boundaries of race or nationality:

popula-

tion numbers, the preservation of natural resources, pollution
abatement and the enlightenment of the human spirit wherever and
however it is oppressed.
Your deliberations here can help to bring that day
closer .

I urge you to continue the quest.

__ _ _ __ ----0._---.
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NEW APPROACHES TO FOREIGN RELATIONS
It may well be recorded in the future that the
whole international order shifted and reorganized itself
in a short span of time in the early 1970's.

The accelerat-

ing transition is evident for those of us who are living
through today ' s changes .
the shift

portend~ .

What cannot be foreseen is what

Does it lead to a new era of confronta-

tion or toward a new plateau of international stability?
How the die is cast depends heavily on the wisdom which we
in the United States bring to our understanding of our
times .
At the outset , I would point to several manifestations of the current transition in the world and the responses
to them in the nation's foreign policy .

The most immediate , of

course , is the President ' s new economic program .

Twenty- five

years of over- extension -,has "s'
..t retched the U. S. economy to the
Qreaking point .

In what amounted
to a financial crisis , the
,

,

,

President combined a de '· facto 'd evaluation of the dollar and a

..
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~

I
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blanket increase in import 'duties
with
a domestic freeze pi
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•

•
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wages and prices.
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That something had to give in the way the U. S.
government was managing the nation1s financial affairs was
evident for a long time.

When the moves came, however, it is

understandable that they caused great distress abroad.

What

1s feared elsewhere, notably in Europe and Japan, is not so
much the moves themselves but what they could portend.

At

stake are the export markets in the United States and, hence,

the shrinking of a grftat deal of international purchasing power .
It is understandable, in the circumstances that the
search for new economic alignments has intensified.

I

The United

Kingdom , is moving, for example, toward the European Economic

1

Community, now, with the support of France.

Germany, in fact

the whole of Western Europe, is tending toward cloaer commercial
relationships with Eastern Europe.· For its part, the Soviet

,.

Union seems eager to facilitate this process through political
stabilization.

,
"

T

,

,

Thus, the legitimacy of

-,

Wes~

Berlin as an

,
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appendage of West Germany has been acknowledged and the
I
"

~
'".

,...~, .,
I
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Soviet government 1s pressing for agreement to

~egalize

the territorial changes in Eastern Europe after World War II,
including the division of Germany .

The awarding of the Nobel

Peace Prize to the German Chancellor Willy Brandt, which, in
my judgment , 1s well deserved, traces in major part to the

impetus that he has given to these developments.

The United

States 1s acquiescing , in the new trends in Europe, at a pace,
however , which seems sometimes as reluctant as it 1s belated,

,
and one would hope that the President's planned visit to
Moscow represents an acceleration of the

adjustment~

U. S. policies are in tranSition, too, with regard

to the Far East.

It seems to me, we may have learned, at last

I

I

in Viet Nam, the folly of extending ideological fears and
great power animosities into the inner conflicts of under-

.

,

developed regions .

The Vietnamese war has been drained of

~ .

"
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.
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meaning for this nation.

lt

l
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ls revealed, now, as a tragic
.

•

'.

,r

waste, a revelation that 1s reflected in the President's
-

-'

program of phased troop withdrawals.
over for this nation .

In that sense, the war is

There is left in Southeast Asia, however,

the vestige of the mistakes of the past which continue to exact
a toll of senseless death and devastation.

One way or another--

by the action of the PreSident or the Congress or by both-I

I
I

I

:I

that vestige must and will be removed .
Perhaps, an end to the Indochinese involvement will

be facilitated by the re-awakening of the Sino.U. S. relationship.
•
In any event, China seems to be moving out of a phase of

isolation into one of more active participation 1n world affairs.

The effect of this transition and the U. S. response to it may
well be causing internal distress 1n China, the Soviet Union,

in Japan and Taiwan and, undoubtedly, new thoughts in all of them.
There 1s a polnt of central significance in these and

similar phenomena .

The lingering legaCies of World War II

are being liquidated in a massive readjustment.

It is a

cataclysmic process , analogous to the geological adjustments
---------.--------~-------------
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,

"

,"

of the earth 1s crust when pent-up »tresses give way along
'.
f..

;

fault lines to produce a new' equilibrlum .

The international

upheaval, like its geological counterpart, causes sharp
reverberations which are widespread and unsettling.
What 1s involved

in

the adjustments, ls,

in

part,

the removal of certain legal straitjackets , self-imposed,
which may come to be regarded, someday, as having been extended
eXercises in ideological rigidity and national pride.

An

example 1s the prolonged diplomacy of non-recognition in which
we chose to engage after World War II .

We refused to countenance

the Soviet enforced territorial changes in Eastern Europe or
the consequences of the Chinese Revolution .

For what seemed

good and ample reasons at the time, it was felt necessary to
cling to the pre-war territorial status quo in Europe, particularly
with regard to Germany, and the pre-revolutionary political
status quo for China .

We are .com'ing to realize, I believe,

that such policies extended indefinitely are self-defeating and
contrary to this natlon 1 s best interests.

That is usually the

"

I

J
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case with policies based
living circumstances.
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as opposed to
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The changes in the lega l perspective of our policies
are over-shadowed for the moment by the adjustments which seek
to accommodate to contemporary economic realities.

In general,

theBe adjustments reflect the fact that the United States,
having served in a variety of roles, a5 the world's chief
banker, policeman, storekeeper and consumer, as well as the
chief pioneer in outer space, has now approached the limits of
its economic capacity and that some of the burdens and the

"firsts!! have to be redistributed .

At last reports, I understand,

we had even abandoned the efforts of the cultural warriors to
"catch up" and surpass the Russians in the classical ballet.
Current adjustments in our international position
have concentrated more heavily on the conunercial.- financial
elements than on certain other over-extended roles abroad,

..

which I shall discuss shortly.

However , I would like to take

a moment to consider at this point what has occurreq under the

.~ ·-',..........···..--..l~-
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President I s new economic prog'ram . .:· The economic power of :the
\

United States has been

quarter century .

,,"

-;.'.

-,
preeminent in
I

,

j'

, ..

,

the world for the past

U. S . markets have absorbed vast quantities

of goods from other nations and sent abroad even greater
quantities .

This nation has led world policy , notably in the

Bo- called Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, into an era of
vastly expanded international trade through the reciprocal

removal of trade barriers .
At the same time , the U. S. has been the central
bankerJof the international payments system.

Settling of

accounts between nations has be en based for a

quarte~

of a

century on the dollar and on its convertibility into gold.

The

. system worked well as long as other nations were prepared to
hold dollars in their reserves or had free access to U. S. gold .
Neither of these conditions remains operative at this time .
So a search for new devices to. facilitate financial exchange
,' .

is unde r way.

In recent international conferences, there have

been pr oposals for the realignments of values among the various
"
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currencies, all acknowledging a lessening of the relative value
of the dollar.

There have also been proposals for devising an

international Bubstitute for the dollar as the central element
1n the international payments system.

"
Proposals of this sort reflect, in my judgment , both
a healthy decline in the economic dependency of others on the
United states as well as an unhealthy loss of confidence in the
stability of the United States economic structure .

Clearly,

the "temporaryll surtax on imports Causes the deepest concern
abroad.

It ought to be of similar concern on our part .

In

my judgment, the curtailment of international trade which is
implicit in this measure 1s not the best way, 1n terms of the

interests of the people of this nation, to bring international
payments into better balance .

If, for no other reason, the new

import levy, by raising the price of foreign goods, creates a
~

.. ,

predisposition to higher pri~es for similar goods within the
•
."J
' .'

United States.
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Far more 1mportant~ 1 we should not lose sight of the
t.1<

.
, :.

r"·!.,

fact that the era of

.

,.

expanding ~international

.r

trade which we

have fostered for two decades may go down as one of the truly
positive advances in international relations in the 20th

century .

It has stimulated a highly useful economic exchange

that has strengthened the fabric of world stability.

It has

served to underwrite, too , a long period of mutual economic
well-being and cultural enrichment .
Necessary though they may be, the new economic
policies are, at

best~

temporary expedients .

Without indulg ing ,

"r hope , in excessive hindsight, I am bound to say that the
adjustments might have been easier for us and all the world,
had we faced up to our predicament at an earlier date and
proceeded in a more measured way to negotiate the necessary
relief.
So far, the other principal trading nations have
,. ,

..

eschewed acts of reprisal.

That unfortunate possibility, however,

does exist and on the basis of very recent reports has, ' now been
"
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by Denmark.
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That is a small 'beginning .

Should there be a

trade war, it would unravel the strands of a beneficial
interdependence which have been woven so carefully over the past
•

two decades.
In the circumstances, I endorse fully the President's
stress on the temporary nature of the surtax and his emphatiq
opposition to a return to economic isolationism.

The possibi lity

of an inadvertant slide in that direction, however, is not to
be overlooked.

To avoid it, it seems to me that we must take

more fundamental steps to redress the economic balance than are
contained in the New Economic Policy.
This brings us to the non-commercial aspects of the
nation's international economic difficulties.

Our present

problem of balance of payments is not so much one . of buying too
much and selling too little of goods and services in international
1.

commerce; the fact is that, for years, we have sold a great

deal more than we have bought.

.

Rather, the difficulty arises,

~.-~. " . . . .--,----~
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1n major part , from the

."

spend~ng
I \

...

of vast amounts of
.

publl~

/'

funds in order to maintain an (outmoded military- diplomatic
position 1n the world .

Dollars spent abroad to underwrite that

position flow overseas just as surely as those which go for

imports of goods from other nations.

I
I'

Dollars spent at home

to backstop t hat position contribute just as certainly to the

inflationary pressures as any other non- productive expenditure
1n the federal budget .

In my judgment ,

we are paying exorbltantly--in

billions of dollars--to sustain foreign policies and practices
which are simply out of date and which no longer have much to
do with the security and welfare of the people of the nation .

Like other legacies of World War II , these po11c1es and pract1ces
are in urgent need of rev1s1on.
There 1s no greater urgency than the 11qu1dat1on of
the war 1n V1et Nam.

,

, I

End1ng the war 1s the most compel11ng

busines·s of this nation.

It is obviously not only a matter of

cost; before all else, Viet Nam is a vast human tragedy which

1

12
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,

.

tears at the fibers of the nation's cohesion. Neverthele~ss ,
r' ..!'\,:.. ~.. ," . ,
Viet Nam is also a root cause O.fJ.the'~ natim t s pr~sent economic

'"

difficulties.

What is involved is an astronomical levy of

government expenditure on the nation's economy in order to

Ij

finance the war, to date, something in the neighborhood of

I

$130 billion.

This expenditure has burdened the productive

economy at home with a heavy surcharge in taxes and inflation,
hence, reducing the competitive position of the nation's
commerce in the world.

A great deal of it, moreover , has been

spent abroad, contriQuting directly to the negative balance of
payments.
In two and a half years , it should be noted, the
President has brought about a significant reduction of the cost
of the involvement in Viet Nam .
has been, it is all to the good .

Prolonged as the reduction
It is to be

hop~d,

however,

that what is being attempted is not simply a gradual tapering
off of the war to a forgotten, Korean-type residue.

In Viet Nam,

that would still involve, for many years , in my judgment,

...

.
.. _ ,......-
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.....
continuing expenditures

'

o~ ' b~lllons
,£1 1 .

(

in aid to the Saigon

,

government as well as the maintenance
of U. S . forces in
, .
coastal enclaves in order to shore up a regime with few roots
in its own people .
war by other means .

It would be a continuation of a mistaken
It would be a way of being involved without

seeming to be involved .

Even if it were possible to attain,

it would be a solution that is ill- suited to the needs of
either Viet Nam or the United States .
The Senate has tried to establish a date certain for

a total withdrawal of
, U. S. forces as the policy of this nation .
Since definitessurances do not yet exist on this point--and
I might say that the outright opposition of the Executive
Branch on this matter only leads to apprehensions as to what
the long range intentions really are-- lt can be expected that
the matter will be pressed in the Congress; it will be pressed
again and again until the

lnvolv~ment

Mainland ends, lock, stock and barrel .

,

•

on the Southeast Asian
As elusive as it has

I

I

, ..-,,,,,
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seemed, the day must and
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h
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will ~ome
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when the last

u.

S.

•

" .'" ,t

soldier boards the last troop carrier, the last , helicopter
lifts off Vietnamese

soil~

and the last U. S. troop Ship

leaves the Vietnamese coast.
When we leave Indochina, we will have closed the

book on military involvement on the Asian mainland.

It would

not be in this nation 1 s interest, however, to close our eyes

to what transpires on the other side of the Pacific.

It is

time to ask ourselves now what .. will remain, not just in

,
Viet Nam but in all of East Asia, not in terms of the devastation and disruption which is self-evident but in terms of new
policies which will safeguard this

nation'~

interest and contri-

but more effectively to peace in the years ahead.
It has seemed to me that the Nixon Doctrine might
contain guiding principles in this respect.

In my

judgment,

that will not be the case unless the Doctrine means the
,, '

complete termination of U. S. military involvement everywhere
,,'
"
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on the Aaian Mainland.

It will not be the caBe unless . the

Doctrine means an end to the practice of maintaining
quasi- dependencies of the United States in Southeast Asia.
In short, the high purposes of the Nixon Doctrine will be
ill- served if it 1s bent in practice to sanction a continuing
intervention, direct or indirect, in the inner affairs of Asian
I

peoples .
On

the other hand , the Doctrine will have constructive

meaning for the years ahead, if it implies as I believe it
implies , a new era of shared responsibility, not only in Asia
but throughout the world .

It will have constructive meaning

if it both preaches and practices a new relationship with other

nations .

It will have that meani ng if it calls for

tl

no more

Viet Nams" and nno more Cambodlas" anywhere in the world .
In my judgment , international circumstances neither warrant
nor permit, as in ' the past, the pursuit of peace by the exer cise
of the predominant effort of the .United States .

The New

f

,

____._. ~_L _~ __
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Economic POlicy should make clear to all that we are headed
down the road to national debilitation if we continue to pursue
peace on that baSis.

I

What, then, of the future of U. S. policy in the
Western Pacific?

The answer, it seems to me, is a clearer

,

,
and cleaner perception of our national interests in the Western

Pacific and an attempt to serve/them by a new and flexible
system of relationships.

Let me say that, as a starter, I

fully support the initiatives of the Administration in seeking
to build a contact of civility with Mainland China.

This

process of diplomatic bridge-building, however, ought not to
proceed

tn

isolation.

It should not lead us to by-pass other

anchor-stones which have already been set in place.

In this

connection, it should be noted that the U. S. approach to
Peking burst on the Japanese government with disturbing suddenness.
It came at a time when Japan already was in a sensitive position
due to a special vulnerability to this nationts new economic

17
policies as well as to the contraction ot our military
projection in Southeast Asia .
In any event, the emergence ot China from a
period of isolation does seem to me to open new approaches
to Pacific security by the avenue of negotiations .

One

would hope , for example, in the not too distant tuture ,
for quadripartite d1scussions ~etween China, Japan, the
Soviet union and the United states .

Such discussions could

do much to allay unwarranted fears and establish a basis for
adjusting national interests .

They could provide insights

into vital questions involving the internal situation in
China,

~nclud1ng

the status of Taiwan, into the anxieties and

intentions of the Soviet Union 1n the Western Pacific , into
the economic needs not only of Japan and the U. S. but of all
four nations , and into the prospects for curbing nuclear
developments in A's ia.

•,

Of immediate importance, quadripartite

~---~--------'---"-------- -I.
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discussions might provide a vehicle for stabilizing and restoring the Indochina peninsula in the post-war era.

Any regional

security arrangements which might ensue therefrom could be dove-

tailed with a progressive reduction in the U•

.s. military presence

around the rim of Asia over the next few years.

In Europe there is also a need to cut outmoded military
I

commitments by new security arrangements, the door to which has now

been

opened by West Germany and the Soviet union.

Insofar as

this nation 1s concerned, i t 1s long past the time to lighten

the archaic burdens of NATO.

Two decades ago; the United States

joined the nations of Western Europe in a common commitment to

the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Treaty remains pertinent today,

I
I

but the bureaucratic organization--NATO--which has grown up
under the Treaty corresponds not

BO

much to contemporary c1rcum-

stances in Europe but to those whi ch existed in Europe before
many of you were born.

,

I
I

I
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At that time, the free societies of Western Europe
were heavily dependent on the United States and the fear of
Communist totalitarian takeovers was great .

in Korea .

A war was raging

It was a time of trouble, of great international

uncertainty .
That 1s not the Bcene today _ Against what 1s now vls1ble--

II
i

a prosperous, stable Western EUrope and a growing contact with

I

Eastern Europe , NATO 1s over-staffed, over-manned, over-officered

I

and over- financed by this nation.
Of the budget of the Department of Defense, about $14
I

billion is estimated to be traceable to NATO .

Over a half-million

American servicemen and dependents are still consigned to Europe .
That 1s an immense diversion of our resources .
question of NATO 1s not cost.

Yet, the basic

If a commitment of that magnitude

were essential for the security of the nation and the stability
Of . th1S nat1on 1 s peace, of course, it should be made .

More to

the point, however, is whether a huge U. S. deployment in Europe
continues to have relevance a quarter of a century after World WarII.

\
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In this connection, I returned just a month ago from a series of
consultations in a number of nations in Western Europe.

The over-

I
whelming mood there is that of detente and peace; it is not of confrontatlon and war.

The emphasis 18 on reconciliation; it 1s on

intra-European commerce, technological exchange, travel and other
cultural interchange.

tary conflict.

It is not on military power or fear of mill-

Only in NATO circles are the games of war still
I

played with any sense of expectancy or conviction in Western Europe.
Let me reiterate my belief that we do need the North
Atlantic Treaty and Alliance.

We do need to preserve the structure

of NATO as an element-in-being of western defense "and unity.

But I

also believe the organization can be trtmmed to a streamlined standby

,
force and our proportionate role can be reduced.

I am persuaded that

that can be done without additional danger to our security or the
stability of peace in Europe and with great benefit to the nation's
well-being.

I am persuaded, too, that unless it 1s done soon, western

unity may very well give way under the weight of its anachronisms.

I
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There 1s a basic lesson in the exceBse8 of policy
in Europe and Asia of the past decade or more.

It should be

r ec ognized and applied to othe r areas of the world .
this:

It is

Military and other national power calcified around

rigid foreign policies tends to be not only wasteful but
dang erous to the nationls future.

wary of all commitments of

We must become extremely

mili~ry

assistance and all forms

of foreign aid in areaS of instability abroad where our national
intereste are not wholly clear or clearly at stake.

That applies with special relevance today to our
involvement in the chronic troubles of the Mideast.
needs to

~be

It hardly

said here that there 1s a great deal of sympathetic

interest in t his nation with regard to the survival of

IBrael ~

It is not inconsistent with either that sympathy or the
interests of this nation, however, to avoid a U. S. military

entrapment in the Middle East which can take the form of an
inadvertent military confrontation with the Soviet Union or

another Viet Nam .

__________________
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What is in our national interest in the Mideast ,
as it is in the interests of all the nations of that region
and the world is the stability of the present truce, the
resolution of territorial conflicts, and, remote as the
possibility may now seem, proeress towards a new era of co-

•
existence and economic interchange between Israel and the

Arab States.
In this

I
conne~tion,

I support the efforts of the

Secretary of State in cooperation with others to secure an
interim peace agreement which has as its main objective the
reopening of the Suez Canal .

As I understand them , the ,

Secretary ' s proposals provide for preliminary agreement on a

cease fire and on the principle of troop withdrawal without
final or complete agreement at this time.

.The rationale , I

should think, 1s that agreement on this ultimate objective,
may make it possible to locate way- stations en route.

_,.l...
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If military restraint and a new emphasis on
multilateral action applies in Asia and the Middle East ,
it applies, too, with regard to Latin America.

Policies

for the Southern hemisphere, it seems to me , must resist
temptations to extend additional military or other unilateral
aid and to reduce further what now flows through these channels.
Unilateral aid can come to represent an intrusion into volatile
political environments and lead, in the end , to direct
involvements .
It should be noted that just last week, the Senate
passed legislation to fund the Inter-American Development Bank
at the annual rate of $900 million for the next two years.
This multi-national institution, along with others of its
kind, should constitute the h eart of the nation ' s forei gn
economic aid policy .

The sooner it brings about the termination

of unilateral U. S. assistance the better for all concerned .

,
Let me close these remarks on the same note on

,,

which they were opened .

Let me stress my belief that we have

1

.•

24
come to a notable turning point and a notable moment of

opportunity.

We will have to

ma~many

changes to adjust

policies effectively to the realities of the 1970's.

The

changes have much ·to do with an end to the illusions of
national omnipotence and omniscience and the tragic adventurism
to which they have led in Southeast Asia.

The changes involve

a readiness to share the glare of world leadership which ' has
focused upon this nation for too long.
We stand, now, on the threshhold of a new era in
which prime motivations are appearing_which are other than the

fear of aggression and war.

I

There may exist a possibility

of breaking down antagonisms along the gulf separating the
Communist states from those of the Western world.

The promise is there.

To realize it will take a

vision of the world far less constrained than has been the
case for the past

twenty~flve

years.

We will have to begin

to view national power not just as an instrument of territorial
defense or the defense of ideological systems, but rather as

-~- --~---

-r--

,
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an element of human survival and well- being .

National

resources can then be committed in far greater degree to the
fundamental problems which know no boundaries of race or
nationality :

Population control, the preservation of natural

resources, pollution abatement and the enlightenment of the
human spirit wherever and however it 1s oppressed.
I

•

r
,
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION :

'i

I am delighted to find myself delivering the benediction
at these proceedings .

I'

POWER IN TRANSITION

It is an uncommon experience.

The last

word is something that is rarely reserved for the Leadership in

a Senate of unlimited

debate~

Notwithstanding this built- in pr opensity for talk ,
however , the Senate has acted with unusual dispatch daring the
past few weeks .

While this symposium has pondered the dilemmas

of power, the Senate has sought to resolve several of them .

With regard to Viet Nam , for example , the Senate
v0ted first to

esta~lish

a national policy of full withdrawal

- 2 -

within six months.

Later> at the insistence of the House, which

had an assist from the Aamlnlstratlon, the specific time span
was removed and full withdrawal was accepted only as a Congressional rather than a national policy.

still later, in other

legislation, and with the reluctant concurrence of the House
and the Administration, the Senate1s insistence on full withdrawal from Viet Nam was established as national policy but
still without a specific withdrawal date.

Finally, in a foreign

aid bill, the Senate 1s making one more effort to restate its
pristine and more emphatiC posit1on on Viet Nam, that Is, full
withdrawal within six

months~

In similar tugs and starts and stops, the Senate voted
to cut, then to increase parts of foreign aid, then to reject it
in toto, only to resuscitate most of the Administration ; s aid
program in two bills a short time later, underscoring the fact
·~hat

foreign aid is e. program with more lives than e. cat.

- 3 Contrary to the appearances, these actions are mor e

II

than marches up the hill and down .

They are not empty gestures .

They say what the people of thenatlon a r e saying .
which is audible in the other Branches they

8~y

In lRnguage

that the Senate

wants the war in Viet Nem to end coopletely and soon .

They say,

too, that the Senate 1s growing insistent on a sweeping revision
and scale - down of fo r eign aid .
The apparent indecisiveness of the actions arises,

in part , from the fact that there are other centers of federal
power-- ln the House and in the Presldency--whereln other ideas
ar e held and with which the Senate must come to terms .
also a r eflection of a kind of dl1€mm8 of power :

It 1s

it 1s sympto-

matic of the uncertainty of the Congress in confronting the
salient factor of the contemporary international situation.
I am sur e this symposium has long since identified
that facto r .
globe .

It is the sur ge of change 'N'hich is sweeping the

From the rimlands of Asia to the western littoral of

•
,

- 4 Europe international relationships of a generation are giving

way; just as currencies, fixed in value for decades, are now
floating, so too are old alliances and alignments .
In this nation, a new outlook 1s readily detectable.
It 1s present especially in the YOWlg who are not bound by the
fixations of the past but it 1s by no means confined to the

young.

The international experiences of the past few

y~ars

have shocked the thought patterns of the entire nation.
In the United states, the time for a change in forei gn
policy 1s ripe.

If this situation finds a counterpart in the

Soviet Union, then we may well be on the threshhold of the
liquidation of the dubious heritage of the cold war .

Ironically,

the era of cold war 1s ending not in the "pos itions of strength,lI
which at one time were regarded in U. S . policy as an essential
of peace; indeed, the Secretary of Defense has even raised
doubts about the present capacity of our defenses .

Nor is the

cold war "1 OF ~ IlS III drastic changes in the state systems of

- 5 Eastern Europe , or the West , which, once in the eyes of mor e
militant ideologists 1n both countries , were held to be the
only baSis for its ending .
Rather, the heat has

~een

taken out of the cold

if I may mix the tempe r atur es, by degrees .

~ar,

Old conflicts have

dissolved slowly in symposia such as the one which 1s taking
place here, to which I allude as symbolic of tne growth of
peaceful interchange between the two systems .
The old conflicts are also diluted by the emergence
of other international

~onslderatlon8

the purview of the two nations .

whic h have pressed into

China , for example, now looms

large in the concerns of the Soviet Union .

At the same time ,

the United States 1s imme-rsed in the practical and urgent
to the economy , more or les s to the

excl~sion

t~'lr eats

of the theoretical

and d istant menaces of alien ideologies .
I r o~icall YJ

this transition comes at a time when the

affair s of the nation a r e presided over by a Republican

- 6 Administration which was once in the front ranks of what was
termed the "battle for the minds of men . II

May I say that the

irony is all to the credit of the incumbent political leaderGhlp .

The President has he en ahle to set aside the things of

the past .

In the light of present realities, he is acting to

remove some of the barnacles which encrust the foreign policy
of the United States .
Without detracting from the Administration's achleveI

ment in any way, I think it 1s fair to note that the times have
been over-r ipe for this change .

I like to think, too, that the

level of reason 1s such in this nation that the transition might
have come under any perceptive administration of whatever parti san stripe .
expectation .

But, perhaps, that 1s an excessively sanguine
In any event, there is little question of the

general effectiveness of the incumbent Administration.

It is

an effectiveness which tends to support Walter Lippmann's thesiS
that liberal change is best brought about by conservative

..
'" #;iJll4l
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- 7 The critical element 1n the Administration's new
approach to international policies, it seems to me , 1s the
Nixon Doctrine which was unveiled in Guam 1n 1969.

That Doctrine

set the stage for a diminution of the role which the United
states has played across the spectrum of world affairs for 25
years.

In s o do1ng, it elevated a concept of policy much arti -

culated but little practiced since World War II -- that of
~esponslbillty

for the maintenance of world peace.

6he~ed

The changes

which have been wrought by the Doctr!.ne are already evider.t not
only in Southeast Asia but elsewhere around the globe, as bases
are closed and U. S. military forces abroad are reduced.
In some quarters , there 1s a tendency to see in this
process of military contraction some sort of shameful furling
of the flag .

Rather, tre change is sensible and long overdue .

It acts to reduce the too heavy burdens which have been carried
for too long by the people of the nation often in the vague
name of Itinternational commitment .1t

Moreover, if the :!"le.- r.as

- 8 been placed by a mistaken policy in places where it does not
belong--as in Indochina-- its withdrawal under the Nixon Doctrine

1s not only an essential act in our vital national interests, it
is also the only honorable course.

Indeed, if the Doctrine 1s

to have historic significance in my judgment, it will bring about
not a partial but a complete termination of U. S . military involvement in Southeast Asia; that means everywhere on the mainland,
be it in Viet Nam, Cambodia, Laos, or Thailand and by land, sea
and air .

The Doctrine will also provide, if it 1s to have historic

significance , the rationale for a continuing reduction in our
one-sided military efforts elsewhere in the world, notably, in
\'lestern Europe under NATO.
NotWithstanding the diminution of the U. S. military
presence abroad , the United States i8 not about to disappear
from the international scene.

This nation's weight is immense

and it will continue to be felt in many ways and in many places.

- 9 That 1s as desirable as it 1s inevitable .

Indeed , a sensitive

concern with affaira beyond our borders remains an essential of
the world ' s civilized survival.

That Buch is the Case argues

strongly fo r a most judicious use of our resources abroad .

There

1s no longe r a surplus to be expended in haphazard, almost lndis criminate fashion , for fear that the label of isolation may
otherwise be pinned on our policies .
It 1s reassuring, therefore, that along with the

military contraction , the omnipresence of U. S. economic aid
1s also in the process of receding around the globe .

In tnls

scale- down which affects largely the bilateral programs of aid,
the Senate has played and will continue to play an important
part.

It is to be anticipated that pressure from the Senate

furthe r
will bring about/changes in the basic design of the program .
The fact is that the present system has lost much of
the charisma which was imparted to it by the Marshall Plan, the
Point-Four program and the Peace Corps of another t ime .

For e:[n
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